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Abstract 
In formal systems for reasoning about actions, the ramification problem denotes the problem 
of handling indirect effects. These effects are not explicitly represented in action specifications 
but follow from general laws describing dependencies among components of the world state. 
An adequate treatment of indirect effects requires a suitably weakened version of the general 
law of persistence. It also requires a method to avoid unintuitive changes suggested by the 
aforementioned ependency laws. We propose a solution to the ramification problem that uses 
directed relations between two single effects, stating the circumstances under which the occurrence 
of the first causes the second. We argue for the necessity of an approach based on causality by 
elaborating the limitations of common paradigms employed to handle ramifications-the principle 
of categorization and the policy of minimal change. Our abstract solution is realized on the basis 
of a particular action calculus, namely, the fluent calculus. 
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1. Introduction 
The ability to reason about changing environments, which involves predicting the 
effects of one’s own actions and explaining observed phenomena, serves humans as a 
basis for understanding the world to an extent sufficient to survive and to act intelligently 
in their habitat. Formal approaches to model this ability have a long tradition in AI. 
This research area was initiated by McCarthy [ 3 11, who claimed that reasoning about 
actions plays a fundamental role in common sense. 
Drawing conclusions about dynamic environments is grounded on formal specifica- 
tions of what effects are caused by the execution of a particular action. Since it is 
obviously infeasible to provide an exhaustive description defining the result of executing 
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an action in each possible state of the world, action specifications should be restricted 
to the part of the world that they affect-while the rest of the world is subject to the 
law of ,~e~~istence, i.e., is assumed to remain stable. Yet even this approach becomes 
unmanageable in complex domains if one tries to put all effects into a single, complete 
specification. Although an action may cause only a small number of direct changes, 
they in turn may initiate a long chain of indirect effects that can be hard to foresee. 
For instance, consider the action of toggling a switch, which in the first place causes 
nothing but a change of the switch’s position. However, the switch may be part of an 
electric circuit so that, say, some light bulb is turned off as a side effect, which in turn 
may cause someone to hurt himself in a suddenly darkened room by running against a 
chair that, as a consequence, falls into a television set whose implosion activates the fire 
alarm and so on and so forth.’ 
The task, then, is to design a framework to formalize action scenarios where action 
specifications are not assumed to completely describe all possible effects. This is called 
the ramification problem. 2 A satisfactory solution to this problem requires a successful 
treatment of the following two major issues. 
First, we need an appropriately weakened version of the aforementioned law of persis- 
tence that applies only to those parts of the world description that are unaffected by the 
action’s direct and indirect effects. As a solution to this problem, we suggest keeping the 
law of persistence as it stands while considering the world description obtained through 
its application merely as an intermediate result. Indirect effects are then accommodated 
by further reasoning until an overall satisfactory successor state obtains. This method 
accounts perfectly both for rigorous persistence of unaffected parts and for arbitrarily 
complex chains of indirect effects. 
Second, indirect effects typically are consequences of additional, general knowledge 
of domain-specific dependencies between world description components (usually called 
puenrs)-but not all effects suggested from this perspective are desirable from the 
standpoint of causality. As an example, consider the simple electric circuit depicted 
in Fig. 1, which consists of a battery, two switches and a light bulb. The obvious 
connection between these components may formally be described by the logic expression 
SM/~ A SW? E light, i.e., the light is on if and only if both switches are on. Now suppose 
we toggle the first switch in the particular state displayed, where both WI and light 
are false while sw2 is true. Then, besides the direct effect of SWI becoming true, we 
also expect that the light bulb turns on. This indirect effect is inspired by the formula 
’ A crucial question in this context concerns the distinction between indirect effects occurring during a single 
world’s state transition step and those which deserve separate state transitions (also called delayed effects). 
E.g., the above may not only be described as “the fire alarm is activated in the successor state after having 
toggled the switch”, but also as, say, “the chair is falling in the successor state (and presumably hits the 
television set during the next state transition)“. As a reasonable, albeit informal, guidance we suggest a single 
state transition should summarize what happens until someone, e.g., the reasoning agent himself, has the 
possibility to intervene by acting again (stopping the chair from falling, for instance) 
* The naming was suggested in [ I5 1, inspired by [ IO 1. The latter, however, was not devoted to the ramifi- 
cation problem in exactly the above sense, contrary to what is often claimed; rather, this thesis describes how 
to exploit logical consequences (called ramifications) of goal specifications in planning problems, with the 
aim of restricting search space. 
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Fig. I. An electric circuit consisting of a battery, two switches, and a light bulb, which is on if and only if 
both switches are closed. The respective state of each of the three dynamic components involved is described 
by a unique propositional constant, where negation isdenoted by a bar on top of the respective symbol. 
just mentioned, which includes the implication SWI A SW:! > light. However, despite this 
being the intuitively expected result, the mere knowledge of the connection between the 
switches and the bulb is not sufficient: Notice that the above formula, SWI ASW~ = light, 
also entails the implication sw1 A light > ~2, which suggests that instead of the light 
being turned on, the indirect effect of toggling the first switch is that the second one 
jumps its position-a result which contradicts our intuition. 
The reason for the inadequacy of merely taking into account formalizations of de- 
pendencies as pure logical formulas-usually called domain constraints-is that these 
formulas do not include causal information. More precisely, the implication swl A light > 
-. 
sw2 IS clearly true in any state and, therefore, contains evidential information, that is, if 
one observes sw1 to be true and light to be false then it is safe to conclude that sw2 is 
false. However, exploiting this implication for reasoning about causality is misleading. 3 
As a solution to the second problem, we propose to incorporate causality in the form 
of so-called cuusuZ relationships, which formalize statements like 
A change of FFi to SWI causes a change of light to light, provided sw2 is true. 
After computing the direct effects of executing an action in a particular state of the world, 
we will apply suitable causal relationships, one by one, to accommodate indirect effects 
until a satisfactory result obtains. Employing a collection of single causal relationships, 
each of which only relates two particular effects, accounts for several indirect effects 
caused by a direct one and also for indirect effects in turn causing further indirect 
effects. To illustrate the latter, consider the relationship 
A change of light to light causes a change of light-detector to light-detector, 
provided detector-activated is true 
in addition to the one above. Since we do not expect the designer of a formal domain 
specification to create a complete set of suitable causal relationships, we will also present 
an automated procedure to extract them from given domain constraints plus some general 
information specifying which fluents may possibly influence other fluents. On the basis 
of a formal theory of actions (to be defined in Section 2)) causal relationships and their 
automatic generation are formally introduced in Section 3. 
3 See [ 33 I for a general discussion on the different natures of causal and evidential implications. 
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Yet the purpose of this article is not only to suggest incorporating causal information 
by means of our causal relationships but also to supply evidence that something like 
this approach is inevitable when trying to cope with the ramification problem. To this 
end, in Section 5 we illustrate the limited expressiveness of existing paradigms aimed at 
handling ramifications, namely, the principle of categorization and the policy of minimal 
change. Roughly speaking, categorization-based approaches distinguish fluents that are 
more likely to change than other fluents (e.g., a change of light is considered more 
likely than a change of sw2). However, we will show that some fluents resist any 
unique categorization (Section 5.1) . Even more common is the assumption of minimal 
change, which amounts to rejecting a resulting state if it is obtained by changing the 
values of strictly more fluents than necessary. While we will offer a formal proof that 
our method captures all intuitively expected resulting states with minimal distance to 
the original state (Section 4), in Section 5.2 we will illustrate that we are also able 
to find non-minimal solutions, which are perfectly acceptable provided all changes are 
reasonable from the standpoint of causality. On the basis of these observations, a detailed 
comparison with related work can be found in the concluding discussion. 
In the second part of the paper, Section 6, we integrate the concept of causal rela- 
tionships into a particular action calculus, namely, the jiuent calculus [ 19,201. While 
for the sake of simplicity states are described via a set of propositional constants in the 
first part (see Section 2), our calculus itself employs a more complex notion of fluent, 
which involves fluent formulas that include quantification. The encoding will be proved 
correct with respect to the formal semantics induced by causal relationships and their 
application as a solution to the ramification problem. 
2. A basic theory of actions 
In the first part of the paper, we employ a suitably simple theory of actions and 
change, which enables us to stress solely on the problem of domain constraints and 
ramifications. The basic entities in this theory are states. A state is a snapshot of the 
underlying dynamic system, i.e., the part of the world being modeled, at a particular 
instant of time. Formally, we describe a state by assigning truth-values to a fixed finite 
set of propositional constants. 
Definition 1. Let 3 be a finite set of symbols called jluent names. A juent literal is 
either a fluent name f E 3 or its negation, denoted by 7. A set of fluent literals is 
inconsistent iff it contains some f E 3 along with 7. A state is a maximal consistent 
set of fluent literals. 
Notice that formally any combination of truth-values denotes a state, which, however, 
might be considered impossible due to specific dependencies among some fluents (see 
below). Throughout the paper we assume the following notational conventions: If e is a 
fluent literal, then by \[I we denote its affirmative component, that is, IfI = 171 = f where 
f E 3. This notation extends to sets of fluent literals S as follows: ]SI = {I[(: e E S}. 
E.g., for each state S we have ISI = 3. Furthermore, if e is a negative fluent literal then 
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2 should be interpreted as IL]. In other words, f = f. Finally, if S is a set of fluent 
literals then by 3 we denote the set (2: ! E S}. E.g., 7 contains all negative fluent 
literals given a set F of fluent names. 
Example 2. To model the electric circuit depicted in Fig. 1, we use the three fluents 
J- = {SW, ) sw2, light} 
to denote, respectively, the states of the two switches and the light bulb. The current 
state displayed in Fig. 1, for instance, is represented by (sw1, SW:!, light}. 
The elements of an underlying set of fluent names can be considered atoms for 
constructing (propositional) formulas to allow for statements about states. Truth and 
falsity of such formulas with respect to a particular state S are based on defining a 
literal e to be true if and only if e E S. 
Definition 3. Let 3 be a set of fluent names. The set ofjuent formulas i  inductively 
defined as follows: Each fluent literal in _??JF and T (tautology) and I (contradiction) 
are fluent formulas, and if F and G are fluent formulas then so are FAG, F VG, F > G, 
and FzG.~ 
Let S be a state and F a fluent formula, then the notion of F being true (respectively 
false) in S is inductively defined as follows: 
(1) T is true and I is false in S; 
(2) a fluent literal e is true in S iff e E S; 
(3) FAGistrueinSiffFandGaretrueinS; 
(4) F V G is true in S iff F or G is true in S (or both); 
(5) F > G is true in S iff F is false in S or G is true in S (or both); 
(6) F 5 G is true in S iff F and G are true in S, or else F and G are false in S. 
Fluent formulas provide means to distinguish states that cannot occur due to specific 
dependencies between particular fluents. Formulas which have to be satisfied in all states 
that are possible in a domain are also called domain constraints. 
Example 2 (continued). We employ the fluent formula swt A swz s light as domain 
constraint to model the intended relation between the two switches and the light bulb. 
This formula holds, for instance, in the state depicted in Fig. 1, viz. {m, swz,light}, 
but is false in, say, the state {swt,swz, light}. 
The second basic entity in frameworks to reason about dynamic environments are 
actions, whose execution causes state transitions. Again, since stress shall lie on the 
ramification problem rather than on sophisticated methods of specifying the direct ef- 
fects of actions, we employ a suitably simple, STRIPS-Style [9,23] notion of action 
specification. Each action law consists of: 
4 As negation can be expressed through negative literals, we omit the standard connective “7”. This is just 
for the sake of readability as it avoids too many different forms of negation. 
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l A condition C, which is a set of fluent literals all of which must be contained in 
the state at hand in order to apply the action law. 
l A (direct) effect E, which is a set of fluent literals, too, all of which hold in the 
resulting state after having applied the action law. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume ICI = lEl (that is, condition and effect refer to 
the very same set of fluent names). This enables us to obtain the state resulting from 
the direct effect by simply removing set C from the state at hand and adding set E to it. 
This assumption does not impose a restriction of expressiveness ince we allow several 
laws for a single action. 
Definition 4. Let F be a set of fluent names, and let A be a finite set of symbols, 
called action names, such that F n A = {}. A n action law is a triple (C, a, E) where 
C, called condition, and E, called e&Sect, are consistent sets of fluent literals such that 
ICI = (El; and a E A. 
If S is a state then an action law (Y = (C,a,E) is applicable in S iff C C S. The 
application of a to S yields the state (S \ C) U E. 
Notice that S being a state, C and E being consistent, and ICI = jE/ guarantee 
(S \ C) U E to be a state again-not necessarily, however, one which satisfies the 
underlying domain constraints. Notice also that it is possible to construct a set of action 
laws which contains more than one applicable law for an action name and a state. This 
can be used to describe actions with nondeterministic effect. ’ 
Example 2 (continued). Suppose our electric circuit domain allows for two actions, 
namely, toggling either switch. These actions are represented by the action names toggle, 
and toggle,, respectively, along with the four action laws 
({SWI},togglq, {swI}), ({m}, Qg&, {sw2}), 
({w},W&, {SWI}), ({~w2>, to&e,, (sw2)). 
(1) 
That is, the only direct effect of these actions is a change of the respective switch’s 
position. When executing, say, toggle, in the state S = {m, sw2, light}, then the first of 
the above laws is applicable due to {w} C S. Its application yields 
(S\ {SWI}) U{swl} = {swl,sw2,light}. 
Notice that our domain constraint SWI A sw2 z light is false in the resulting state. 
Our example illustrates that a state obtained through the application of an action 
law may violate the underlying domain constraints since only direct effects have been 
specified. In the next section, we develop a method to further modify such a preliminarily 
resulting, impossible state in order to account for additional, indirect effects. 
5 Suppose, as an example, that a gun nondeterministically gets loaded or not when spinning its cylinder [ 38 J 
This may be formalized by the two action laws ({ }, spin, { }) and ({loaded), spin, {loaded}). Both of them 
are applicable in the state {loaded}, which suggests two possible outcomes, viz. {loaded} and {loaded}. 
See [ 451 for details on how to represent and reason about nondeterministic actions on this basis. 
M. Thielscher/Artijicial Intelligence 89 (1997) 317-364 323 
3. Causal relationships 
The ramification problem arises as soon as it does not suffice to compute the di- 
rect effects of actions. This is the case whenever the resulting collection of fluent 
literals violates underlying domain constraints, which in turn give rise to additional, 
indirect effects. In theory, we could of course compile all conceivable indirect effects 
into action laws by exploiting the fact that an arbitrary number of different laws for a 
single action can be formulated. For instance, in our running example we could replace 
({SWI},togg&{swi}) by the two laws ({swl,~w~,light},togglei, {swt,sw2,light}) and 
({swI,m, light}, t oggle,, {SW, Yi@, light}). If now toggle, is applied to the state 
{swI,sw2, light}, then we obtain the desired result, viz. {SWI,SW~, light}. However, 
this procedure bears two major problems which demonstrate its inadequacy. First, it 
may require an enormous number of action laws to account for every possible combi- 
nation of indirect effects. Consider, for example, a model of an electric circuit where a 
distinguished switch is involved in n sub-circuits each of which additionally contains a 
switch-bulb pair in a similar fashion as in Example 2. Defining all effects of toggling the 
separate switch solely by means of action laws would then require 2”+’ different laws, 
one for each possible combination of truth-values assigned to the switch being operated 
and the other n switches. The second problem with exhaustive action laws is that the 
introduction of a new domain constraint may cause, in the worst case, a re-definition of 
the entire set of action laws used before. 
3.1. Applying causal relationships 
As a consequence of the above observations, we keep the given action laws but 
regard a state obtained after having computed the direct effect merely as intermediate. 
Any single indirect effect is then obtained according to a directed causal relation between 
specific fluents. For instance, having as direct effect a change of the first switch into its 
upper position in the state depicted in Fig. 1, this is regarded as additionally causing 
the light bulb to change its state also, for the second switch is on. We will formalize 
causal relationships of this kind by expressions like 
SWI causes light if sw2. (2) 
Formally, such expressions operate on state-effect pairs (S, E) where S is the current 
collection of fluent literals and E contains all (direct or indirect) effects that have 
been considered so far. E.g., let S = {SW, sw~, light} be the state obtained after hav- 
ing computed the direct effect of toggle,, as described in the preceding section, then 
E = {SWI}. The causal relationship formalized in (2) gives rise to the indirect effect 
light, which supersedes light in S. This new effect is added to E. Altogether, this results 
in the state-effect pair ({swi , sw2, light}, {SW,, light}). 
The reason for maintaining the second component, E, is that identical intermediate 
states S can be reached by different sets of effects E, each of which may require a 
different, sometimes opposite treatment. Suppose, as an example, there are two switches 
which are mechanically connected (say, through a spring) such that they cannot be 
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-- closed simultaneously. The corresponding domain constraint, swt V sw2, gives rise to 
two causal relationships, viz. 
-. 
swi causes SW:! If T, (3) 
sw2 causes SW] if T. (4) 
Now, toggling the first switch in the state {FiFt,sw~} yields the intermediate state 
{swt , sw2) if we apply the corresponding action law in ( 1). The very same intermediate 
state is obtained by toggling the second switch in the state {swl , SWT}. Yet the intended 
outcomes differ considerably: In the first case, the final result should be {swt,sw~}, 
while {SW,, sw2) is expected in the second case. This distinction can only be achieved 
by referring to the differing direct effects, {swt} and {SW*}. The former enables only the 
application of (3) to the intermediate result, {swt,sw2}, the latter only the application 
of (4). In both cases, this leads to the desired unique successor state. 6 
The formal definition of causal relationships and their application is as follows: 
Definition 5. Let 3 be a set of fluent names. A causal relationship is an expression 
of the form E causes Q if 0 where Q, is a fluent formula based on 3 and E and Q are 
fluent literals. 
Let (S, E) be a pair consisting of a state S and a set of fluent literals E, then a causal 
relationship E causes Q if @ is applicable to (S, E) iff @A3 is true in S and E E E. Its 
application yields the pair (S’, E’) where S’ = (s\(P)) U{Q} and E’ = (E\(e)) U{Q}. 
Let R be a set of causal relationships, then by (S, E) -q (S’, E’) we denote the 
existence of an element in R whose application to (S, E) yields (S’, E’). 
In words, a causal relationship is applicable if the associated condition @ holds, 
the particular indirect effect Q is currently false, and its cause .s is among the current 
effects. Notice that if S is a state and E is consistent, then (S, E) +R (S’, E’) implies 
that 5” is a state and E’ is consistent, too. ’ In what follows, we say that a sequence 
of causal relationships ~1,. . . , r, is applicable to a pair (SO, Eo) iff there exist pairs 
($,EI),...,(S,,,E,) suchthatforeach 1 <i<n,riisapplicableto (Si_l,Ei_l) and 
yields (S;, E,). We adopt a standard notation in writing (S, E) AR( S’, E’) to indicate 
the existence of a (possibly empty) sequence of causal relationships in R which is 
applicable to (S, E) and yields (S’, E’). 
Now suppose we are given a suitable set of causal relationships and have obtained a set 
of fluent literals S after having computed the direct effects of an action via Definition 4. 
State S may violate the underlying domain constraints. In order to obtain a satisfactory 
resulting state, we compute additional, indirect effects by (nondeterministically) select- 
ing and (serially) applying causal relationships. If this procedure eventually results in a 
state satisfying the domain constraints, then this is called a successor state. 
h Other examples that require taking into account how an intermediate state is obtained will be discussed in 
Sections 3.3 and 5.3. 
’ In order to guarantee consistency of E’, we remove the negation ij from E prior to adding Q. This is 
necessary because z may have been generated as a direct or indirect effect before, which has to be withdrawn. 
An example where this situation occurs will be discussed below, in Section 5.2. 
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Definition 6. Let 3 be a set of fluent names, A a set of action names, L a set of action 
laws, 2) a set of domain constraints, and R a set of causal relationships. Furthermore, let 
S be a state satisfying D, and let a E A be an action name. A state S’ is a successor state 
of S and a iff there exists an applicable (with respect to S) action law (C, a, E) E C 
such that 
(1) ((S\C) UEE) -r;)n( S’, E’) for some E’, and 
(2) S’ satisfies 2). 
Example 2 (continued). An adequate set of causal relationships for our electric circuit 
domain consists in the following four elements: 
swl causes light if sw2, sw2 causes light if swt, 
SW1 causes light if T, sw2 causes light if T. 
(5) 
In words, if either switch gets closed, then this causes the light bulb to turn on provided 
the other switch is already on. Conversely, opening either switch results in a dark bulb 
regardless of the other switch. 
Applying the first action law in ( 1) to the state depicted in Fig. 1, viz. {m, sw2, 
light}, yields the state-effect pair ({SW, ,swz,light}, {SW,}). Then the first of the 
given causal relationships is applicable, and its application results in ({swt , sw2, light}, 
{SW,, light}). The first component of this pair satisfies the underlying domain constraint, 
SWI A sw2 = light, hence is a successor state. Moreover, it is the unique successor since 
no other causal relationship in (5) is applicable to ({SW,, swz, light}, {SW,}) and since 
({SW], sw2, light}, {SWI, light}) does not allow for further application of causal relation- 
ships. 
Later in this paper, in Section 5.2, we will see that the order in which causal re- 
lationships are applied, might be crucial insofar as a different ordering may allow the 
application of different relationships. On the other hand, we can prove the following 
important result of order independence in case a unique set of relationships is applied: 
Proposition 7. Let F be a set of fluent names, S a state, and E a set of JIuent literals. 
Furthermore, let r-1, . . , r, be a sequence of causal relationships (n 2 0) applicable to 
(S, E) which yields 
(SE) -{r,) (&,EI) +-+{rz) ... -+{r,,} (Sn,&). (6) 
Then, for any permutation rn( 11, . . . , r,(,) which is also applicable to (S, E) and which 
yields 
(SE) -+{r,,,,)) ($3;) *{r_,?,) ... -rl_,,,i) (S:,,E:), 
we have S,, = S:, and E,, = E:,. 
(7) 
Proof. For each fluent name f E F’, let k; be the number of causal relationships ri = 
.ei causes f if @i, and k7 the number of causal relationships ri = ei causes 7 if @; 
(1 < i < n). The application of a causal relationship ei causes pi if 0; requires that 
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e; be true in the state at hand. Therefore, the finally resulting truth-value of f depends 
only on kf’ and k;. * Since (6) and (7) do not differ in this respect, we know f E S,, 
iff f E SA. Likewise, we have f E En iff f E EL and 7 E E, iff 7 E EA. 0 
It is important to realize that neither uniqueness of a successor state nor even its ex- 
istence is guaranteed in general. The former characterizes actions with nondeterministic 
behavior-examples of this kind will be discussed in detail later, e.g. in Section 5.2. 
The meaning of the latter will be elucidated in Section 3.3. First of all we raise another 
crucial issue, namely, how to obtain an adequate set of causal relationships on the basis 
of given domain constraints. 
3.2. Influence information 
Obtaining the intended result by applying causal relationships to compute the indirect 
effects of actions relies, of course, on a suitable set of these relationships. Any of 
these sets should be sound in that each element represents an intuitively plausible 
causal relation, and it should also be complete in that it covers all conceivable indirect 
effects. 9 The four causal relationships (5)) for instance, constitute a set suitable for the 
electric circuit domain. There is obviously a close correspondence between the elements 
of this set and the domain constraint underlying this example scenario, which is why 
the following analysis is devoted to the problem of how an adequate set of causal 
relationships can be automatically extracted from given domain constraints. 
There is, however, a crucial, well-known obstacle to be considered towards this 
end [ 241: Despite the fact that the causal relationships in (5) are inspired by the 
underlying domain constraint swi A sw2 = light, this formula would give rise to ad- 
ditional, unintended causal relationships if evaluated purely syntactically. For instance, 
recall the causal relationship swt causes light if sw2 in (5). The fact that if swr 
becomes true then it is impossible to have both SW:! and light, equally well suggests the 
following causal relationship: 
_. 
swl causes sw2 if light. (8) 
This would, however, sanction the state {SW,, m, light} to be a possible successor state 
of turning on SW] in the state depicted in Fig. 1. In other words, the second switch 
would magically jump its position in order to satisfy the domain constraint. Though 
this is an unintuitive outcome, the mere domain constraint does not provide enough 
information to rule out (8). Hence, we need some additional domain knowledge to be 
able to automatically design a suitable set of causal relationships. 
More precisely, we will exploit general information of potential influence of some 
fluents upon others. For instance, we provide the knowledge that changing a switch’s 
’ More precisely, if .f E S then either:: = k7 or k; = kT - 1. In the first case, we have f E S, (and 
.f’ t En iff k; > 0), in the second case .f E S, (and f E E,,) The analogue holds for 7 E S. 
‘) Here, “conceivable” can-to state the obvious-refer only to what is potentially derivable given the do- 
main constraints. One cannot expect to obtain an indirect effect desired in some scenario if the scenario’s 
formalization does not include a piece of knowledge hinting at the possible existence of this effect. 
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position might influence the state of a light bulb rather than directly causing other 
switches to move. lo This kind of information is formalized as follows: 
Definition 8. Let F be a set of fluent names. A binary relation Z C F x F on these 
fluent names is called inJ7uence information. 
If (j-1, f2) E 1, then this is intended to denote that a change of fl ‘s truth-value po- 
tentially affects the truth-value of f2. Regarding the electric circuit domain, for instance, 
we choose Z = {(SW,, light), (sw2, light)}, that is, both switches might influence the 
light but not vice versa nor do they mutually interfere. 
Domain constraints plus influence information provide enough information for au- 
tomatically generating an adequate set of causal relationships. The basic idea is to 
investigate all possible violations of a domain constraint and to formalize causal rela- 
tionships which help to “correct” this. More precisely, let 27 be the set of underlying 
domain constraints. We first construct the conjunctive normal form (CNF, for short) of 
A 27, i.e., of the conjunction of all constraints. Then ZJ is violated iff some conjunct 
!I V . . V f,, in the CNF is violated. This in turn means that c A A G holds. Since 
the initial state supposedly has satisfied ;I), the reason for !I A A .t?,, being true must 
be some (direct or indirect) effect q, and this “flaw” can be “corrected” by changing 
some other literal & to !k via a causal relationship-but only in case the fluent I!./ 
potentially affects the fluent I& according to Z. All this is formalized in the following 
definition: 
Definition 9. Let F be a set of fluent names and D a set of domain constraints. An 
influence information Z then determines a set of causal relationships R following this 
procedure: 
(1) Let R := {}. 
(2) Let D1~...AD,betheCNFofA\.Foreach D;=!?,V...V&, (i= l,...,n) 
do the following: 
(3) For each j = 1,. . . ,mi do the following: 
(4) For each k= l,..., mi, k #j such that (i!jl, l&l) E 1, add this causal relation- 
ship to R: 
6 causes ek if /j &. (9) 
I = I, ,,I, 
ISi,iSk 
Notice that none of the causal relationships e causes e if @ generated by this 
procedure (cf. (9)) exploits the general expressiveness because the condition @ is, 
in any case, a conjunction of literals-whereas Definition 5 allows arbitrary formulas. 
However, this does not imply that some causal information otherwise being representable 
cannot be obtained by applying Definition 9. This is so because any causal relationship 
can be transformed into an equivalent set of causal relationships of the form (9). On 
‘(‘The word “directly” is crucial here since switches do have the ability to influence the position of other 
switches indirectly, e.g., through activating a relay (see Example 17, below). 
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the other hand, employing the general notion may lead to considerably more compact 
representations. More sophisticated means to extract causal relationships from domain 
constraints without constructing normal forms should be developed to this end; yet this 
goes beyond the scope of this paper. ‘I ‘I2 
Example 2 (continued). Given domain constraint D = SW! A sw2 E light and influence 
information Z = {(SW] , light), (SW:!, light)}, by applying Definition 9 we obtain causal 
relationships as follows: 
l The CNF of D is (m V E& V light) A (swl V light) A (swz V light). 
-- 
l As regards the first conjunct, D1 = SWI V sw2 V light, we obtain the following: 
- Incasej=l, k=2 wehave (swi,sw2) $Z. 
- In case j = 1, k = 3 we have (SW,, light) E 2, which yields 
SW] causes light if sw2. 
_ In case j = 2, k = 1 we have (sw~, swl ) $5’ 1. 
- In case j = 2, k = 3 we have (sw~, light) E 2, which yields 
SW:! causes light if SW]. 
- In case j = 3, k = 1 we have (light, SW] ) $Z Z. 
_ Incase j=3, k=2 wehave (light,swz) $1. 
l As regards the second conjunct, D2 = swt V light, we obtain the following: 
_ In case j = 1, k = 2 we have (SW], light) E 1, which yields 
SW] causes light if T. 
- In case j = 2, k = 1 we have (light,swl ) @ 1. 
l As regards the third conjunct, 03 = sw2 V light, we obtain the following: 
- In case j = 1, k = 2 we have (sw~, light) E Z, which yields 
sw2 causes light if T. 
- In case j = 2, k = 1 we have (light, sw2) $ Z. 
Altogether, we obtain exactly the four causal relationships listed in (5), which we have 
granted above to obtain the desired solution. 
A crucial issue regarding the concept of causal relationships is of course its complex- 
ity. Notice that in the worst case exponentially many causal relationships have to be 
” To be more precise, the task would be to construct, for any two literals e and Q such that (I&l, 101) E 2, 
a causal relationship E causes p if P where Y is most simple in describing the circumstances under which 
effect E gives rise to indirect effect p. This might, for instance, be accomplished by collecting all causal 
relationships obtained via Definition 9 for E and Q, i.e., E cauaea Q if @I,. , E causes p if @,,,, and 
defining P as the most compact formula equivalent to @I V V @,,,. 
I2 A related challenge would be to find suitable deductive representations of the way domain constraints 
in conjunction with influence information give rise to causal relationships. This may, roughly speaking and 
without going into details, look like Causes(E, p,@) E Infi( IFI, Ipl) A Vs[Holds(@,s) A Holds(E, s) > 
Holds( Q, s) 1. Such a deductive characterization could prove useful in a variety of particular action calculi. 
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generated due to the potential combinatorial explosion of the size of the domain con- 
straints during the CNF construction. Up to quadratic many relationships exist for each 
resulting conjunct. Despite these pathological cases, there is, however, a decisive char- 
acteristic due to which especially in large domains the number of causal relationships is 
small compared to the worst case: the domain constraints do not interfere. In general, 
large domains tend to be locally structured in that each single domain constraint relates 
only a small number of fluents. Suppose the maximum size of a domain constraint (i.e., 
the number of fluent names involved) be fixed and small compared to their overall 
number n. Then the number of causal relationships being generated is linear in n. As an 
example, recall the situation discussed at the beginning of this section, where a distin- 
guished switch, swa, affects II different sub-circuits each containing another switch, swi, 
and a bulb, lighti (1 < i < n). The dependencies are described by n domain constraints 
of the form swo A sWi z light,. As argued above, compiling all indirect effects into action 
laws requires 2 +t different laws for toggling SWO. In contrast, only 4n causal relation- 
ships are needed, viz. four for each sub-circuit similar to the ones listed in (5). Notice 
that it still pays regarding the computational effort when actually computing successor 
states since in any case at most II causal relationships have to be applied when toggling 
SWO. Hence, we have avoided the exponential factor of this example in any respect. 
The fact that domain constraints do not interfere in determining causal relationships 
avoids the second crucial problem mentioned at the beginning. No existing causal rela- 
tionship has to be modified or removed if new domain constraints are added. 
Before we conclude this section, let us stress that influence information always re- 
flects the desired direction of chains of indirect effects. As argued in [ 411, it may 
sometimes be desirable to define a direction of reasoning which does not correspond 
to the physical reality. Consider, as an example, a light bulb being connected with two 
parallel switches, that is, either switch can be used to turn on the light. This is expressed 
by the domain constraint swi V sw2 z light. Suppose we define an action turn-on-light 
in addition to toggle, and toggle2 (cf. ( 1)). The corresponding action law shall be 
({light}, turn-on-light, {light}). If this action is applied to the state S = {m,m, light}, 
then, as argued in [41], one expects ramification to tell us that either SW] or else swz 
becomes true in addition to the direct effect, light. I3 Obtaining this by means of causal 
relationships requires the consideration of additional directions of influence, namely, that 
a change of fight may affect SWI and sw2. This is formally represented by extending 
the influence information used in Example 2 by (light, SWI) and (light,swz). Based 
on the resulting Z = { (swt , light), (swz, light), (light, swl ) , (light, sw2) }, the domain 
constraint swt V sw2 G light gives rise to the following causal relationships according to 
Definition 9: 
SWI causes light if T, sw2 causes light if T, 
SW] causes light if swz, ?Z$ causes light if swt, 
light causes swt if m, light causes sw2 if K, 
(10) 
light causes Yogi if T, 
-. 
light causes sw2 if T. 
” This may not correspond to everyone’s intuition, but let us accept it for the sake of argument 
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-- 
Recall the state S = {SW], sw2, light} and the action turn-on-light. The application of the 
aforementioned action law for turn-on-light yields the state-effect pair 
({swI,SE, light}, {light}). 
Its first component violates the underlying domain constraint. The only applicable causal 
relationships in (10) are the ones in the third row. The resulting state-effect pairs are 
({swl,sw2,light}, {light,swl}) and ({swI,swz, light}, {light,swz}). 
In both cases, the first component satisfies the domain constraint, hence constitutes 
a successor state. Notice that no further causal relationships in ( 10) are applicable to 
either of these state-effect pairs. Hence, the resulting states are the only successor states. 
This illustrates that having cyclic influence information does not necessarily imply that 
there are cyclic, hence infinite, chains of applications of causal relationship. The reader 
is invited to verify that also if toggle, or toggle, (cf. ( 1) ) are applied to any possible 
state with fluent names SW], sw2, and light, then the causal rules in (10) never support 
infinite application sequences. 
3.3. Indirect effects versus implicit qualijcation 
Thus far we have seen how domain constraints give rise to additional, indirect effects 
of actions. However, it has been observed e.g. in [ 15,261 that domain constraints might 
instead give rise to additional, implicit qualifications of actions. In the following, we 
illustrate that the concept of causal relationships along with the notion of potential 
influence perfectly accounts for this distinction. 
Example 10. Consider the following adaption [ 1 ] of the yale shooting scenario [ IS]. 
We intend to hunt a turkey which is either alive or not (described via the fluent name 
alive) and which is walking around or not (fluent name walking). The domain constraint 
walking > alive restricts walking turkeys to vivid ones. Let Z = {(alive, walking)}, that 
is, a change of alive might affect the truth-value of walking but not vice versa. According 
to Definition 9, this determines a single causal relationship, viz. 
ulive causes walking if T. (11) 
Consider, now, the action law ({alive}, shoot, {alive}). Fig. 2 illustrates the respective 
results of executing shoot in the two states which satisfy alive. In case the initial state 
is {alive, walking}, it is sufficient to compute the direct effect, alive. If the initial state 
is {alive, walking}, then the underlying domain constraint gives rise to an additional, 
indirect effect via ( 1 1)-not only does the turkey drop dead, it also stops walking. 
In contrast, suppose we want to entice the turkey if it idles [ 291. The corresponding 
action law is ({wulking},entice, {walking}). Fig. 3 shows the respective results when 
entice is applied to the two states which satisfy walking. Again, if the initial state is 
{alive, walking}, then the direct effect suffices to obtain a state satisfying the domain 
constraint. The initial state {z,walking} is different: Applying the aforementioned 
action law yields {alive, walking}, which violates the domain constraint. Moreover, ( 11) 
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shoot {alive, walkzng} __, {alive, walking} 
- 
Fig. 2. The application of ({alive},shoot, {alive}) to the initial state depicted in (a), where the turkey is 
not walking, results directly in a state that satisfies the domain constraint walking > alive. In case the action 
law is applied to the initial state depicted in (b) , an additional ramification step based on ( 11) has to be 
computed in order to ensure the turkey stops walking when shot dead. 
{alive, lualling} entice l {alive, dking} 
(Q) > 
enlice {allve,waltifig} A {alive, &king} 




Fig. 3. The application of ({walking}, entice, {wdkin~}) to the initial state depicted in (a), where the turkey 
is alive, results directly in a state that satisfies the domain constraint walkirq > alive. In case the action 
law is applied to the initial state depicted in (b), the intermediate state violates the domain constraint. This 
cannot be “corrected” on the basis of the given causal relationships, ( I I). Hence, the action entice cannot be 
successfully executed in a state where the turkey is not alive 
is not applicable to the corresponding state-effect pair ({alive, walking}, {waking}) 
since alive does not occur as effect. Hence, no successor state exists according to 
Definition 6. In other words, our domain constraint gives rise to the additional, implicit 
qualification that a turkey must be alive if we want to successfully entice it-which is 
exactly the desired conclusion. 
In general, whenever no successor state exists according to Definition 6, then this 
hints at implicit qualifications of the action under consideration (cf. the remark at the 
end of Section 3.1). This shows that providing adequate influence information gives 
332 M. Thielscher/Artijiciul Intelligence 89 (1997) 317-364 
for free, by means of causal relationships, the distinction between ramification and 
qualification. 
4. A fixpoint characterization of ramifications 
The successive application of causal relationships can be regarded as a somewhat op- 
erational solution to the ramification problem. In this section, we relate our approach to 
the more static, fixpoint oriented characterization of indirect effects introduced in [ 291. 
This method is based on the idea of minimizing change while respecting causal infor- 
mation. The objective of our comparison is to prove that all successor states satisfying 
the definition of [29] are also obtained by the application of causal relationships. 
As we have argued, an adequate solution to the ramification problem requires more 
sophisticated information of causal dependencies than provided by the mere domain 
constraints. This is why it is insufficient to simply minimize change, i.e., to take as 
possible successor state any state which has minimal distance from the initial state and 
which satisfies both the direct effect and the underlying domain constraints. Neither does 
this allow for preventing unintended changes nor does it enable us to distinguish between 
ramifications and qualifications (cf. Section 3.3). As a consequence, in [ 291 it is 
suggested to replace domain constraints by a suitable set of directed rules, called causal 
rules, which serve as deduction rules and are therefore weaker than the corresponding 
implications. 
Definition 11 (see [ 291) Let 3 be a set of fluent names. A causal rule is an expres- 
sion @ + ?P where @ and P are fluent formulas. 
Let C be a set of causal rules. If 0 is a set of fluent formulas, then by 7~ (0) we 
denote the smallest set of fluent formulas which contains 0 and is deductively closed 
under C-that is, 
(1) @C Z(O); 
(2) for any formula 0 such that 7~ (0) /= 8 we have 6’ E E( 0); and 
(3) if @+P E C and @E Ic(0) then P E 7c(O). 
If 0 E 7~ (0) then this denoted by 0 l-c 19. 
Example 2 (continued). Consider the singleton set of causal rules C = {SW, A sw2 =+ 
light}. Let 0 = {swr , SW~}, then It(O) includes light since the given causal rule is 
applicable. In contrast, let 0’ = {SW,, light}, then sw2 $ 7~ (0’) despite sw2 follows 
from swi, light, and swi A sw2 > light. 
Causal rules serve as the basis for a fixpoint characterization of successor states which 
accounts for indirect effects. Informally speaking, after having executed, in a state S, an 
action with direct effect E, then a state T is successor iff the following holds: 
l T satisfies E, 
l T is consistent with the set of causal rules, and 
l each change of a truth-value from S to T is grounded on some causal rule. 
This last condition reflects the idea of minimal change. 
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Definition 12 (see [29] ). Let _F be a set of fluent names, A a set of action names, C 
a set of action laws, and C a set of causal rules. Furthermore, let S be a state and a E A 
be an action name. A state T is a minimal change successor of S and a iff there exists 
an applicable (with respect to S) action law (C, a, E) E L: such that 
T={k (snT)UEtcl}, 
i.e., T is fixpoint of the function AT. {e: (S f’ T) U E kc e} given S and E. 
(12) 
Example 2 (continued). An adequate set of causal rules for the electric circuit domain 
consists of the following three elements: 
SW] A sw2 + light, 
SW] + light, 
SW:! 3 light. 
(13) 
Let S = {m, sw2, light} as depicted in Fig. 1, and suppose we apply the action law 
({SWI}, toggle,, {swt}). Th e only minimal change successor is T = {SWI , sw2, light}: 
We have (SnT) U E = {sw~} U {SWI}, and the causal rules in ( 13) allow to additionally 
derive light. In contrast, the unintended state T’ = {swI,~, light} does not satisfy 
Eq. ( 12): (S fl T’) U E = {light} U {SW,}, which does not allow for deriving the missing 
literal, K. I4 
The following observation justifies the naming “minimal change successor”: Each 
state T satisfying (12) has minimal distance from S, that is, there is no state T’ with 
less (with respect to set inclusion) changes while also satisfying E and the rules in 
C. IS 
Observation 13. Let 3 be a set ofJuent names, C a set of causal rules, S a state, and 
E a consistent set ofjuent literals. Then for any two states T and T’ satisfying ( 12)) if 
S n T 2 S n T’ then T = T’. 
Proof. Since each of S, T, and T’ is a state, S n T = S n T’ implies T = T’. Moreover, 
assuming S r? T 2 S n T’ leads to a contradiction: Let J! E S n T such that 1 $! S n T’, 
i.e., ? E T’. Since T is consistent and satisfies (12), we have 
(SnT)UEl+cj. 
On the other hand, we know 
(SnT’) UEbc? 
I4 It is also interesting to see why T” = {swt ,sw~, light}, where only the direct effect is computed, does not 
satisfy E?q. (12): (S n T”) U E = (sw2,light) U {swi} allows to additionally derive light given (13); thus, 
T” is not a fixpoint. This illustrates that all formulas @ > P induced by causal rules @ =S Q hold in minimal 
change successors. 
” Observation 13 is a consequence of a theorem stated and proved in [ 291, which essentially relates Defini- 
tion 12 to the basic definition of the possible models approach 148 J Below, we provide a direct proof. 
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dueto?ET’.Together, (SnT)UEl+c?and (SnT’)UEkc?show that?-e(SnT’) g 
7~ ( S n T) . This contradicts S n T 2 S n T’. I6 0 
In what follows, we restrict attention to non-disjunctive causal rules @+ P, where 
P is a conjunction of literals. I7 Since @ + !I A . . . A & (n 3 0) is equivalent to the 
n rules @ + Ct , . . . , @ + &, we assume, without loss of generality, that the consequent 
of a rule is a single fluent literal. Moreover, computing some It(O) is only needed in 
Eq. ( 12), where 0 is guaranteed to be a set of literals. Thus, each causal rule of the 
form @t V @2 =+ t can equivalently be replaced by @t + L plus @ + !. This allows us 
to assume each causal rule be of the form lr A . . A & + 1 where !, 11, . , . , !,!! (m 3 0) 
are fluent literals. In what follows, for notational convenience we will formally treat the 
antecedent of a causal rule, @, as a set of literals. The conjunction of these literals will 
be denoted by A@. 
The main result of this section will be a proof that each minimal change successor can 
be obtained by applying our approach developed in Section 3. Not only does this verify 
that our method covers all intuitively expected successor states with minimal distance 
from the original state, it also provides a means to actually compute minimal change 
successors. Notice that, following Eq. (12), these states have to be guessed prior to 
testing whether they satisfy the condition of Definition 12. 
In view of the intended result, we first present a pseudo-iterative characterization of 
minimal change successors and prove its adequacy: 
Proposition 14. Let 3 be a set ofpuent names, C a set of causal rules, S a state, and 
E a set of literals. For each state T we define 
(1) To(T) := (SfIT) u E. 
(2) Ti(T) :=ri_l(T)U{l: @=+!eC~nd@&Ti_l(T)},fori=1,2,....’~ 
Then T satis$es (12) iff T = Up” T;(T). 
Proof. We have to prove {e: (S n T) U E kc !} = Ui”, ri( T) . 
“LHS C RHS”: Let e E LHS. In case ! E (S n T) U E, we find that e E To(T) C 
u,“, ri(T). 0th erwise, (S JY T) U E t-c ! implies the existence of a finite sequence 
@t + et,. . , Gn + t?, of inference rules in C (n 3 1) such that ! = & and, for each 
1 < i < n, @i 2 ( S n T) U E U {l, , . . . , !;- 1). Consequently, e E r,(T) C Up” ri( T) . 
“LHS > RHS”: By induction on i, we prove ri( T) C: {k ( S fl T) U E kc e}. The 
base case, i = 0, holds by definition since To(T) = (Sn T) U E. For i > 0 let e E ri( T) 
such that there exists some @ + e E C where @ C Ti- 1 (T) . The induction hypothesis 
for T,_,(T) implies (SnT) UEtc A@, hence (SnT) UEI-c l. 0 
This alternative characterization of minimal change successors forms the basis for 
proving the formal relation between this concept and the application of causal relation- 
I6 Notice that 7~ is obviously monotone, that is, 8 C H’ always implies 7~ (8) & lc (69’) (cf. Defini- _
tion I I ). 
I7 A brief discussion on the nature of disjunctive causal rules can be found at the end of this section. 
‘* Recall that @ is considered a set of literals. 
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ships. To this end, each causal rule @+! determines a corresponding set of causal 
relationships. It also induces the domain constraint A@ > e, which has to be satisfied 
by a state resulting from the successful application of a series of causal relationships. 
Besides exploiting Proposition 14, the crucial point in the following proof is to ensure 
that whenever a causal rule is actually applied to justify an indirect effect, then a corre- 
sponding causal relationship E causes Q if Qi is also applicable. The latter particularly 
requires E occur in the current set of previously obtained (direct or indirect) effects E, 
i.e., the second component of the current state-effect pair (S, E). 
Theorem 15. Let 3 be a set of fluent names, A a set of action names, C a set of 
action laws, and C a set of causal rules. Furthermore, let 2) = (A @ > .k @ =+ C E C} 
be a set of domain constraints, and let R be a set of causal relationships containing 
for each {PI,. . . , p,,} + e E C and each 1 < i < n the element 
q3; causes e if p1 A . . . A q~;_~ A pi+] A . . . A pan. (14) 
Let S be a state which satisfies V, and let a E A be an action name, then each minimal 
change successor T (with respect to C) of S and a is successor state (with respect to 
R and V) of S and a. 
Proof. Let (C, a, E) E C be any action law such that C G S. We prove by induction 
that for each i E No there exists a pair (S;, Ei) such that ( (S \ C) U E, E) -&,( S,, Ei) 
and Ti(T) C S, and Ti(T) \ S & Ei (cf. Proposition 14). I9 In what follows, for the 
sake of readability we abbreviate T(T) by r. 
In case i = 0, SO := (S \ C) U E and Eo := E satisfy the conditions: We have 
To = (S n T) U E c (S \ C) U E since ICI = [El and ro is consistent. Furthermore, 
To\S=((SnT)uE)\SCE. 
For the induction step, let i > 0 and ($_I, Ei-1) satisfy the claim. Then, let 
{e, ,..., &}:={!: !~r,ande@Ti_r} (15) 
be the set of all literals that are added to Ti_1 to obtain Ti. Hence, there exist m causal 
rules @I + J?I,. . . ,Gnt =+&, E C such that @,i 2 rj-1 for each 1 < j < m. Let us 
consider the first rule, @1 + 11. From the induction hypothesis we conclude Ti_ 1 c Si_ 1 
and, consequently, @I C Si-1. Moreover, we can find some p E @I such that p E E,_l: 
Assuming the contrary, i.e., Ei-1 n @I = {}, the induction hypothesis ri-1 \ S c E,-1 
implies (ri-1 \ S) n @JI = {}. Th’ 1s implies @I C S since @I 2 r;-1, hence II E S 
(since S satisfies D), hence @I > [I). From !I E ri C T we also know Cl E SnT C TO. 
This contradicts el # Ti-\ (cf. ( 15) ) . 
Thus, the causal relationship rp causes e, if A(@* \ {p}) in R is applicableto 
(Si-1, Ei-1) provided e, E Si_l . But Si-1 is a state, that is, if it does not contain (1 it 
already contains e,, and the causal relationship need not be applied. Hence, either we 
can obtain ((Si-1 \ {I}) U {e,}, (E,_l \ (1)) U {!I}), or else we keep (Si_I,E,_I) 
I’) The very last condition ensures the aforementioned applicability of all relevant causal relationships as 
regards the set E; of previously obtained (direct or indirect) effects. 
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and know 11 E Si_1. Likewise we can successively proceed with all other literals, 
&, . . , , l,,,, provided there is no k E (2, . . . , m} and 9 E @k such that cp E Ei- 1 
but cp # (Ei-1 \(&,., . , &I)) U if?,, . . . ,Pk_1}. In other words, we have to prove 
there is no causal relationship rp causes & if A\(!& \ ($0)) (2 < k < m) which 
was applicable to (&I, Ei_ I ) but is not so after first having computed el, . . . , &- ,. 
To see wky this is guaranteed, let us assume the contrary. Then rp E E,-l and cp $E’ 
(E~-~ \ (4,. . .,ek-l}) u{b.. , ek_I } imply p E {!, , , ek-1 }. This and 9 E @k C 
Ti-1 assert the existence of some e,i E {e,, . ( &_l} such that c E Ti-1. In conjunction 
with 8, E Ti (cf. (15)), this contradicts T > T,_l U TI being consistent. 
To summarize, having successfully applied all m causal relationships (whenever nec- 
essary), we obtain the two sets 
S;:=(Si_l\{~ ,..., %})U{l, ,..., &,} and E~=(E;_I\E)UL, 
where L = (a,,... ,&) \ S. The pair (Sj,E,) satisfies the claim: r, C S; (due to 
fi_l & S,-1 and (15)) and Ti \ S C E, (due to Ti_1 \ S C Ei-1 and (15)). 
Since there exists only a finite number of changes from S to T, we have Uz r; = r, 
for some II E No. Because r, = T is a state, T C S,, implies T = S,,. Consequently, 
((S\Cl u-&E) * Q--+_ (T, En), that is, T is successor state. 0 
Interestingly, the converse of this theorem does not hold, that is, there might exist 
successor states (in the sense of Definition 6) that cannot be obtained using the fixpoint- 
based approach. In Section 5.3, we argue that these states are intuitive, and failing to 
detect them with the approach discussed in this section is due to the policy of minimizing 
change, which thus might be too restrictive. 
Finally, recall that our result is restricted to non-disjunctive causal rules. In the re- 
mainder of this section, we briefly discuss the nature of rules involving disjunctions in 
their consequent, as in 
T=s-UVC. (16) 
Typically, disjunctive rules are used to express nondeterministic behavior. For instance, 
-- 
given S = (a,~}, there exist two different minimal change successors with respect to 
( 16) (suppose E = {}), viz. T, = {a, i?} and T2 = (5, c}, respectively. *O Notice that 
T3 = {u, c} is not a minimal change successor since merely having a V c does not allow 
for concluding a nor c. The latter observation suggests that (16) could equivalently be 




Indeed, these rules yield the same result as above when applied to the state S = {E, Z}. 
This indicates that a disjunctive rule Qi+ PI V . . . V ?Pn can often be adequately repre- 
sented by the rz rules 
-- 
*” To see why, take S f’ T, = {E}, say, which entails the missing literal, o, given (1 V c via ( 16). 
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where i = 1,. . . , n. However, ( 16) and ( 17) are not generally equivalent if additional 
causal rules are considered. For example, if we add these two rules to (16): 
aVc*a, 
aVc*c, 
then T = {a,~} is minimal change successor of S = {a,?} since S n T = {} and 
{} t-{(t6),(ts)) a A c. In contrast, no minimal change successor of S with respect to 
{ ( 17)) (18)) exists. Yet this example lacks significance: Notice that antecedent and 
consequent of the causal rules in ( 18) share fluent names, which is why it is hard 
to imagine a meaningful causal relation expressed by these rules. But it is also hard 
to imagine a more convincing example since adding, say, a V c + d instead of ( 18) 
does not make (16) and (17) behave differently. This strongly suggests that requir- 
ing non-disjunctive causal rules means no severe restriction when formalizing causal 
information. 
5. The necessity of causal relationships . . . 
In this section, we contrast the proposal to employ causal relationships with other 
abstract concepts that are most widely used (often in slightly different variants) to tackle 
the problem of undesired indirect effects in the context of the ramification problem. Our 
aim is to illustrate the restrictive expressiveness of these concepts compared to our 
method. We accomplish this by discussing some prototypical example scenarios, which 
every reasonable formalism for reasoning about actions must at least be able to treat 
correctly. 
5.1. . . compared to categorization-based approaches 
The standard approach to avoid intuitively unexpected indirect effects is to introduce 
some sort of categorization among the underlying set of fluent names. This distinction 
between different, typically two or three, kinds of fluents comes along with a specific 
notion of preference as regards changes in one category compared to changes in other 
ones when computing ramifications-or, less sophisticated, only a particular category is 
subject to the law of persistence etc. While a variety of names for such fluent classes 
circulate in literature, *’ the common fundamental assumption of categorization-based 
approaches is that an appropriate categorization always exists. With a simple extension 
of our electric circuit domain, we will illustrate that the role of a fluent might be less 
obvious in this respect, which causes difficulties in finding a single appropriate category 
it belongs to. To this end, we employ the following, prototypical categorization-based 
definition: 
*’ E.g., frame versus non-frame fluents [241; relevant versus dependent [ 4 1; persistent versus non-persistent 
I 11; or persistent, remanent and contingent fluents [ 6 1. 
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light 
Fig. 4. An extended electric circuit described by five fluents. The two possible states of the first switch are 
up (SW] is true) and down (swt is false). The current state is described by ?iCi (the first switch is down), 
sw2 (the second switch is closed), m (the third switch is open), relay (the relay is deactivated) and m 
(the light bulb is off). 
Definition 16. Let 3 be a set of fluent names. Furthermore, let, for each state S, 3,) (S) 
(primary fluents) and 3,Y (S) (secondary fluents) 22 be two disjoint subsets such that 
3,,(S) u 3;(S) = 3. Let S, T, T’ be states, then T is closer to S than T’, written 
T -+ T’, iff 
(1) either lT\S/n3,,(S) 5 IT’\Slf13,j(S) 
(2) orIT\S/n3~~(S)=IT’\SIn3,,,(S) andIT\SIn3Y(S) zIT’\SIf13S(S). 
Let D be a set of domain constraints, A a set of action names, and C a set of action 
laws, If S is a state and a E A an action name, then a state T is a categorization- 
bused mccesmr of S and a iff there exists an applicable (with respect to S) action law 
(C, a, E) E C such that 
(1) EGT; 
(2) T satisfies 27; and 
(3) there is no T’ -Q T such that E C: T’ and T’ satisfies D. 
In words, a state T is closer to some state S than a state T’ iff S and T differ in less 
(with respect to set inclusion) primary fluents than S and T’ do, or else S, T and S, 
T’ differ in the same primary fluents but S and T differ in less secondary fluents than 
S and T’ do. For instance, to prefer a change of the light bulb’s state compared to a 
switch magically jumping its position in Example 2, we consider swi, sw2 primary and 
light secondary in any state. Then the application of ({m}, toggle,, {SW, }) to the state 
S = {x, sw2, light} admits, as intended, T = {SWI , sw2, light} as the unique categoriza- 
tion-based successor since T -+ T’ for the counter-intuitive state T’ = {SWI , m, light}. 
Consider, now, the following extension of our electric circuit (see also Fig. 4): 
Example 17. We augment Example 2 by introducing a third switch, represented by the 
fluent name sws, plus a relay, represented by relay. If activated, the relay is intended 
to force the second switch (swz) to jump open. The relay is controlled by the first and 
third switch. Formally, the dependencies among all these components are described by 
the following domain constraints: 
22 The terms “primary” and “secondary”, respectively, were inspired by [ 40 ) 
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swl A sw2 c light, 
Z@ A sw3 = relay, 
relay > sw2. 
(19) 
Let S denote the state of the circuit depicted in Fig. 4. In order to find an adequate 
partition of the involved fluent names into primary and secondary fluents, respectively, 
observe first that we should have swt , sw2 E F,, (S) and light E 3$,(S) as above. For if 
we toggle either of swl or sw2, then we prefer a change of light instead of a change of 
the other switch (as regards the first domain constraint). Analogously, we should have 
SW] E 3,,(S) and relay E Fs( S). For if we close the third switch, then we prefer a 
change of relay instead of a change of the first switch (as regards the second domain 
constraint). Hence, we obtain swt , sw2 E 3P(S) and light, relay E 3$(S). 23 
Suppose, now, we close the third switch, sws. Obviously, the expected result is that 
the relay becomes activated, which in turn causes the second switch, sw2, jumping its 
-- 
position. Indeed, the corresponding state {swi , sw2, sw3, relay, fight} is a categorization- -- 
based successor of S = {W, swz, F@i, relay, light} and a = toggle, (given the action law 
({m}, toggle3, {sw~})): Besides the direct effect {sws}, the above domain constraints 
suggest that a second primary fluent, SW] or sw2, must change its truth-value since 
any state with swt, sw2, sws being true violates (19). However, the observation that a 
second primary fluent has to be changed suggests another categorization-based successor, 
namely, where swi changes its truth-value instead of swz: The reader is invited to verify 
that the state {SW,, sw2,5&, relay, light}, too, satisfies the conditions of Definition 16 
as it does not violate the domain constraints and has minimal distance to S. Hence, we 
obtain a second successor state where the first switch magically opens, the relay remains 
deactivated and the light bulb turns on. 
The reason for the unexpected second state to occur in this example is that we 
necessarily fail to assign a unique, appropriate category to fluent sw2, whose role is 
twofold: On the one hand, it should be considered primary (regarding the sub-circuit 
involving SWI and light), and on the other hand, it behaves like a secondary fluent (as 
regards the relay). One might suggest that this particular example could be modeled by 
just introducing an additional category of, say, tertiary fluents, 3t( S), which have even 
lower priority than secondary fluents. Then, taking swt E 3/,(S), sw2, relay E 3,Y( S), 
and light E 3, (S) and extending Definition 16 appropriately yields the expected unique 
resulting state. However, besides the somehow strange categorization, where similar 
entities, namely switches, belong to different categories, this particular classification 
requires a deeper analysis of possible direct and indirect effects in the electric circuit 
and is far from being intuitively plausible. Moreover, it is not hard to imagine more 
complex domains requiring more and more categories, which heavily increases the 
difficulty of deciding to which class a particular fluent name should belong. 
In contrast, since causal relationships in conjunction with influence information only 
describe local dependencies, they can easily deal with fluents which behave differently 
regarding different domain constraints: 
23 Whether SWJ is considered primary or secondary is irrelevant for our argument 
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Example 1’7 (continued). The possible influences in the electric circuit depicted in 
Fig. 4 are represented by this relation: 
Notably, this information concentrates on direct influences only, which, as we shall 
see, is sufficient; nothing has to be stated about the possibility that sw3 might indirectly 
influence SW:! (through the relay). Notice also that sw2 occurs both as first and as second 
argument in 2, which encodes its twofold nature in this example. Applying Definition 9 
to the domain constraints (19) in conjunction with Z yields the following nine causal 
relationships: 
SW] causes light if sw2, sw2 causes light if swi, 
ECi causes light if T, sw2 causes light if T, 
EVi causes relay if swj, sw3 causes relay if swi, (20) 
swi causes relay if T, sw3 causes relay if T, 
-. 
relay causes sw2 If T. 
The topmost four relationships are obtained from the domain constraint SW] ~sw2 G light 
as described in detail in Section 3.2; the domain constraint WA sw3 = relay yields, in 
a similar way, the next four relationships; and, finally, from relay > sw2 we obtain the 
last relationship due to (relay, sw2) E Z. 
Suppose given the state depicted in Fig. 4, i.e., S = {swl,~w2,SW3,k&j,light}, plus 
the action law ({m, toggle,, {swj}). Then the starting point for the application of 
causal relationships is the state-effect pair 
({~,SW~,SW~,relay,light},{sw~}). (21) 
The state violates the second domain constraint in (19). The only applicable causal 
relationship in (20) is sw3 causes relay if m. Its application yields 
({m, swz, sw3, relay, light}, (sw3, relay}). 
Now the state violates the third domain constraint in (19). The corresponding causal 
-. 
relationship in (20), namely, relay causes SW:! If T, is the only applicable one. Its 
application yields 
({W,m, sw3, relay, light}, {sw~, relay,FiT5}). 
The first argument satisfies the underlying domain constraints and, consequently, denotes 
a successor state. Since there is no alternative way of applying causal relationships to 
(21), there are no other successor states. This is exactly the desired conclusion in this 
example. 
5.2. . . . compared to the policy of minimal change 
A widely accepted assumption concerning the ramification problem says that gen- 
erating indirect effects ought to satisfy the property of minimal change. Regardless 
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Fig. 5. A modified electric circuit (cf. Fig. 4) augmented by a device, represented by detect, which registers 
an activation of the light bulb (this device combines a phototransistor and Bipflop). The current state is 
described as in Fig. 4 except that now sws holds (the third switch is closed) and the state of the additional 
device is assumed to be detect (no action of light has occurred). 
of possible categorizations as discussed above, whenever a “proper” successor state is 
strictly closer to the original state than another “proper” successor state, then the latter 
should be rejected. Yet while the result proved in Section 4 shows that our method 
covers all states that confess to the minimal change policy, it is not restricted in this 
respect. The following example shows the importance of this in that requiring minimal 
change might fail to obtain all intuitively expected possible successor states, hence might 
lead to unintended conclusions. 
Example 18. The extended electric circuit from Example 17 is slightly modified and 
further augmented by a light detecting device (fluent name detect) that becomes (and 
stays) activated as soon as the light bulb turns on (see Fig. 5). The new arrangement 
is encoded by the following domain constraints: 
SW! A sw2 E light, 
SWI A sw3 = relay, 
relay 3 FC@, 
light > detect. 
(22) 
After enhancing the influence information Z used in Example 17 by (light, detect), these 
domain constraints give rise to the following causal relationships: 
swl causes light if sw2, swz causes light if SW], 
SWI causes light if T, sw2 causes light if T, 
swl causes relay if sw3, sw3 causes relay if swl, 
SWI causes relay if T, sw3 causes relay if T, 
-. 
relay causes sw2 if T, light causes detect if T 
(23) 
Suppose we toggle the first switch, SW], in the state depicted in Fig. 5. What is the 
expected outcome? Obviously, the relay gets activated and, then, attracts the second 
switch, swz. Hence, the latter is open in the finally resulting state. Notice, however, 
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that as soon as the first switch is closed, the sub-circuit involving the light bulb gets 
closed, too. This may activate the light bulb for an instant, that is, before the second 
switch jumps its position as a result of activating the relay. If this is indeed the case, 
then this short-time activation might be registered by the photo device, detect. Hence, 
while it is clear that the light bulb is off in the resulting state, it may or may not be the 
case that detect becomes true. We therefore should expect two different successor states, 
viz. T, = {SW,, sw2, sw3, relay, light, detect} and T2 = {SW,, sw2, SW~, relay, m, detect}. 
Notice that these states differ only in the value of the fluent detect. Notice also that T, -~- 
and the initial state, S = {m, sw2, sw3, relay, light, detect}, differ in strictly less fluents 
than T2 and S do. 
Our set of causal relationships (23) supports this conclusion. The application of 
({K}, toggle,, {SW,}) to S yields the state-effect pair 
({SW,, ~w~,sw3,G,light, detect}, {SW,}). (24) 
The first component violates both the first and the second domain constraint in (22). 
There are several possibilities to proceed. First, we can apply SWI causes relay if sw3 
-. 
followed by relay causes sw2 if T, which results in 
({SW,, sw2, sw3, relay,light,detect}, {sw~, relay,FiE}). 
The first argument satisfies the underlying domain constraints and, consequently, denotes 
a successor state (as expected, cf. T, above). 
Another possibility to proceed with the state-effect pair (24) is to apply the following 
chain of causal relationships: 
swl causes light if sw2, 
SW] causes relay if sw3, 
-. 
relay causes SW:! If T, 
SW? causes light if T. 
(25) 
In words, we first conclude the light bulb turns on due to the second switch being on. 
However, since the activation of the relay causes SW? to become false, we have to “turn 
off” the light bulb again via the finally applied causal relationship. Thus, we obtain the 
pair 
({SW, ,m, sw3, relay,light,ZiZ}, {SW,, relay,JiE,light}). 
Again, we obtain the successor state TI. But we have not considered all possibilities 
yet. Recall the chain of causal relationships in (25). Since light is true and among the 
current effects after having applied the first of these relationships and remains true until 
the last one is applied, we can insert the causal relationship light causes detect if T 
somewhere in between. This additionally causes detect become true, that is, the finally 
obtained state-effect pair is 
( (swi ,w, SW~, relay, tight, detect), {SW!, detect, relay, m, tight)). 
Its first component is identical to the second expected successor state, T2. No further 
successor states can be obtained, which is exactly the desired conclusion. 
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To see why no minimal change-based formalism can possibly obtain this, consider 
these causal rules C: 
swl A sw2 + light, m+ light, SW:! + light, 
SWI A sw3 * relay, m * relay, sw3 * relay, 
relay * SW:!, light =+ detect, 
in conjunction with S as above and E = {SW,}. While Tr = {SW, m, sws, relay, light, 
detect} satisfies Eq. ( 12), Tz = { - swt , swz, sws, relay, light, detect} does not since 
(SnT2) uE={ sw3, light} U {SW,} ifc detect. 
State TI being the only minimal change successor suggests that detect necessarily remains 
false, which is obviously too optimistic a conclusion. 
This last observation suggests that minimization is not always an adequate concept 
for distinguishing between possible indirect effects on the one hand, and unfounded 
changes on the other hand. In fact, the aim of generating ramifications is not to minimize 
change but to avoid changes that are not caused, which, as we have seen, need not be 
identical. 
5.3. . . . compared to causal rules 
We have seen in Section 3.3 that domain constraints may give rise to implicit quali- 
fications instead of indirect effects. By Example 10 we have illustrated that sometimes 
even a single constraint acts in both fashions, depending on which effect actually oc- 
curs. Both causal relationships and causal rules allow for modeling this distinction.24 
However, the expressiveness of causal rules with this respect is limited compared to 
the concept of causal relationships. The reason is that the applicability of a causal 
rule like et A !2 + e, say, is not restricted to situations where !t occurs as effect 
(causing /J as ramification in case !2 being true), while & occurring as effect (with 
!r being true and _!! being false) shall indicate an implicit qualification. In contrast, 
causal relationships support this sophistication, 25 which is required in the following 
scenario: 
Example 19. Let us consider a more subtle, ancient method to hunt turkeys, namely, 
by using a (manually activated) trapdoor. The state of this trapdoor is described using 
the fluent name trap-open. The fluent name at-trap describes whether the turkey is in 
the dangerous zone or not, and the fluent name alive is used as before. The ground 
underneath the trapdoor is designed such that if the turkey finds itself being at-trap 
24 Regarding Example 10 with domain constraint wulkin~ > alive, this is achieved by taking the causal 
relationship a[ive causes s if T but not walking causes alive if T; similarly, one would employ -- 
the causal rule alive + walking but not walking + alive [ 291. 
25 This is why n different relationships are needed to represent a rule with n literals in its antecedent (cf. 
(14) in Theorem 15). 
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and the trapdoor is open, then it cannot be alive. This is represented by the following 
domain constraint: 
at-trap A trap-open > alive. (26) 
We can open the trapdoor via the action law ({trap-open}, open, {trap-open}) and 
entice the turkey via ({at-trap, alive}, entice, {at-trap, alive}). While the state of the 
trapdoor can possibly influence the victim’s state of being alive or not, the turkey is 
alert to the extent that it would never kill itself by moving towards the open trap- 
door; thus, at-trap can never influence alive. The latter is intended to give rise to the 
implicit qualification trap-open for entice. Hence, the adequate influence information 
is Z = {(trap-open, alive)}. In conjunction with (26)) this determines a single causal 
relationship according to Definition 9, namely, 
trap-open causes alive if at-trap. (27) 
Given the state S = {alive, at-trap, trap-open} (say, after having enticed the turkey), 
executing open yields {alive, at-trap, trap-open} as intermediate state, which violates 
our domain constraint. Since trap-open occurred as effect, the causal relationship (27) 
is applicable, which results in the expected successor state {alive, at-trap, trap-open}. 
In contrast, consider the state S = {alive,at-trap, trap-open} and the action entice, 
whose execution yields the intermediate state {alive, at-trap, trap-open}, too. But now 
(27) is not applicable since trap-open did not occur as effect, that is, no successor state 
exists. In other words, trap-open is an additional, implicit qualification for entice, which 
is exactly the intended result. Notice that we are only able to distinguish between these 
two cases by employing (27) but not the analogous causal relationship at-trap causes 
alive if trap-open. For both correspond to identical causal rules, namely, at-trap A 
trap-open + alive, this distinction goes beyond the expressiveness of causal rules. 
6. A fluent calculus realization 
Having presented, thoroughly discussed, and demonstrated the benefits and expres- 
siveness of our approach to the ramification problem, the second part of the paper is 
devoted to the development of a suitable, concrete calculus. Our encoding employs the 
representation technique underlying the Jluent calculus [ 19,201. Unlike previous fluent 
calculus-based approaches, however, we do not develop a logic program but exploit the 
full expressiveness of first-order logic. We begin by defining an appropriate term repre- 
sentation of states in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2, we then model causal relationships and 
their execution. The resulting encoding is proved adequate with respect to the high-level 
action semantics proposed in the first part of the paper. 
6.1. Reified states 
The atomic elements of state descriptions have been restricted to propositional con- 
stants throughout the first part of the paper, for the sake of simplicity. For our calculus, 
we introduce a richer notion of fluents. A fluent is now an n-place predicate with ar- 
guments chosen from a given set of objects (or entities) [22,38]. This involves both 
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a generalized concept of action laws and fluent formulas including quantifications. Yet 
by requiring finiteness of any underlying set of entities, we still guarantee decidability 
in any respect. The following definition extends Definition 1: 
Definition 20. Let c? be a finite set of symbols called entities. Let F denote a finite 
set of fluent names, each of which is associated with a natural number called arity. A 
jZuent is an expression f( 01, . . . , 0,) wherefE~isofaritynandot,...,o,EC?.A 
jluent literal is a fluent or its negation, denoted by f( 01, . . , o,,). 
Let li be a denumerable set of variables. An expression f( tl , . . , t, ) and its negation 
.f(t1,... , t,,) are called jluent expressions iff f E F is of arity n and ti E 0 U V ( 1 < 
i<n). 
As before, a state is a maximal consistent set of fluent literals. For the sake of 
readability, from now on we implicitly assume an arbitrary but fixed set c3 of entities, 
a set F of fluent names, and a set V of variables, respectively. 
Example 2 (continued). The extended expressiveness is exploited to model the electric 
circuit domain as follows. Consider the two entities 0 = { st , $2) representing the two 
switches, along with the unary fluent OIZ describing the state of its argument. In addition, 
the nullary fluent light denotes the state of the light bulb as before. The state displayed 
in Fig. 1 is then formalized as S = {on(st),on(s2), light}. 
As opposed to the situation calculus [ 32,371, the fluent calculus employs structured 
state terms, each of which consists in a collection of all fluent literals that are true in the 
state being represented. To this end, fluent literals are reified, i.e., formally represented 
as terms. These terms are connected via a special binary function, which is illustratively 
denoted by o and written in infix notation. For instance, a term representation of the 
state S= {on(s~),on(s*),light} is 
(on(s~> oon(s2)) alight 
where the bar denoting negative fluent expressions is formally a unary function. It has 
first been argued in [ 191 that this representation technique avoids extra axioms (e.g., 
frame axioms [ 17,321) to encode the general law of persistence: The effects of actions 
can be modeled by manipulating terms like (28) through removal and addition of sub- 
terms. Then all sub-terms which are not affected by these operations remain in the state 
term, hence continue to be true. 
Intuitively, the position at which a fluent literal occurs in a state term should be - - 
irrelevant. That is, (28) and the term on( ~2) o (light o on( SI) ), say, represent identical 
states. This intuition is modeled by requiring the following formal properties for the 
connection function 0: 
Qx, y, 2. (X 0 y) 0 z = x 0 ( y 0 z ) (associativity), 
\Jx, y. xoy=yox (commutativity ), 
Qx. x00=x (unit element) 
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where the special constant 8 denotes a unit element for o. This constant represents the 
empty collection of fluent literals. The above axioms constitute an equational theory, 
which we abbreviate by ACI. Given the law of associativity, from now on we omit 
parentheses on the level of 0. Notice that the axioms AC1 formalize essential properties 
of the data structure “set”. 26 For formal reasons, we introduce a function r which maps 
sets of fluent expressions A = {!I, . . . , &} to their term representation rA = 1, 0 . . . 0 !,, 
(including r{) = 8). 
In conjunction with the standard axioms of equality (see (29), below), our equational 
theory entails the equivalence of two state terms whenever they are built up from an 
identical collection of fluent literals. These axioms alone, however, do not suffice for 
our encoding. For it will also be necessary to prove the inequality of two state terms 
whenever they do not contain the same fluent literals. This requires an extended notion 
of the standard so-called unique name assumption. More precisely, we adopt the concept 
of unijcation completeness known from logic programming (see, e.g., [ 21,42,47] ) . Let 
E be an equational theory, that is, a set of universally quantified equations. Two terms s 
and t are said to be E-equal, written s =E t, iff s = t is entailed by E plus the standard 
axioms of equality. A substitution (T is called an E-unifier of s and t iff scr =E tu. A 
set CUE (s, t) of E-unifiers of s and t is called complete if it contains, for each E-unifier 
of s and t, a more or equally general substitution.27 Unification completeness is then 
defined as follows: 
Definition 21. Let E be an equational theory. A consistent set of formulas E* is called 





x=y>y=x (symmetry ) , 
x=yAy=z >x=z (transitivity), 
x;=y>f(x1,..., X; )...I x,) (29) 
=.f(x1,...,y,...,x,7) (substitutivity I), 
x1 =y 3 P(Xl,..., Xi ,..., x,7) 
EP(Xl,... , y, . . . , x,,) (substitutivity II), 
for each n-place function symbol f and predicate P, and for each 1 < i < n. All 
variables are universally quantified. 
Equational formulas, i.e., formulas with “=” as the only predicate, such that for 
any two terms s and t with variables X the following holds: 
The axioms in E. 
The standard equality axioms, viz. 
x The reader may wonder why we do not additionally require the function o be idempotent. The (subtle) 
reason for this is given below, right after Proposition 22. 
*’ That is, whenever su =E tc~ then there exists some V’ E CUE( s, f) such that (d <E U) Iv~,,.(,~)~v~,~(,). 
Here, Var( t) denotes the set of variables occurring in term r, and ((r’ <E a)lv means the existence of a 
substitution 0 such that (~‘0 =E g) 1”. The latter holds iff for each variable x E V, the two terms (x(r’)O 
and X(T are E-equal. 
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(a) If s and t are not E-unifiable, then E* /= 4X. s = t. 
(b) If s and t are E-unifiable, then for each complete set of unifiers CUE( s, t) 
we have 
where r denotes the variables which occur in g= but not in 2. ** 
As shown in [ 201, a unification complete theory for our axioms AC1 can be obtained 
by computing, for any two terms s, t, some complete set CuACl (s, t) of ACl-unifiers 
(see, e.g., [ 5,431) and adding the corresponding equational formula which is to the 
right of the entailment symbol in (30). In what follows, this unification complete 
theory will be called extended unique name assumption, abbreviated by EUNA. As 
an example, consider the terms on(x) o z and on(sl) o on( ~2) o light. The singleton -- 
set {{x H 97, z H on(si ) 0 light}} is a complete set of ACl-unifiers of these terms. 
Hence, 
EUNA + Vx, z [on(x) o z = on(sl) oon(s2)olight>x=s;!Az=on(s~)olightJ 
according to (30). 
Before we proceed with the fluent calculus encoding, we prove some crucial properties 
of EUNA. These properties show how the subset relation and the set difference and union 
operations can be modeled on the term level. 




Proof. ( 1) In case A C B, let Z = B \ A, then rA 072 and 7~ are ACl-equal. According 
to Definition 21, this implies EUNA k 7~ o i-2 = ~-8, hence EUNA b &.rA o z = 78. 
In case A g B, ?-A o z and r8 are not ACl-unifiable. According to Definition 21, this 
implies EDNA + \Jz. ?-A 0 z $78. 
(2) Let z be a term then r,J o z and rs are AC l-equal iff each fluent literal occurring 
in ?-A 0 z also occurs in 7-B and vice versa and no fluent literal occurs twice or more in 
r,.$ o z This in turn is equivalent to z and rs\A being AC l-equal (given A C B), hence 
EDNA b z = rB\A. 
(3) A term z and the term ?-A o r8 are ACl-equal iff each fluent literal occurring in 
z also occurs in ?-A o 78 and vice versa and no fluent literal occurs twice or more in z 
(given A n B = 0). This in turn is equivalent to z and rAUs being ACl-equal, hence 
EDNA + Z = r,&JfJ. q 
2x By CT= we denote the equational formula xl = [I A A x II = tll constructed from the substitution 
v={X,Htl,..., XnHfll}. 
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For illustration, let 
A = {Ms2)}, 
B = {on(sl),on(sz),light}, 
C = (on(sl),light}, 
then A C B and A fl C = {}. Accordingly, 
(1) EUNA ~3z.on(s2) oz =on(s,) oon(s2) alight, 
(2) EUNA j= Vz [on(s2) 0 z 
-- 
=On(sl) oOn(s2) OlightZ z =orl(sl) alight], 
(3) EUNAkVz[z = ( ) on s2 oon(sl) alight= z con olightoon(s2)l. 
In particular, the equivalence expressed in clause (2) of the above proposition will be 
used below to model the removal of an action’s condition from a state. That is, if C is the 
condition of some action, S is some state, and z is a term such that EUNA /= TC oz = Q-~, 
then we know that z represents the set S\C. Precisely this is the reason why the function 
o is not required to be idempotent. For if it would be, then 7~ o z = rs would not imply 
z = ?-sic. E.g., if 0 were idempotent, then for any Set A we would have r/1 0 $-A = 7A. 
But clearly 7~ $ TA\A unless A = {}. In contrast, without o being idempotent, EUNA 
entails 7-A 0 7,~ $ TA whenever 7~ $0, i.e., A + {}. 
We are now prepared for defining the circumstances under which a term represents 
a state. We use a many sorted logic language with four sorts, namely, fluent literals, 
collections (of fluent literals) , action names, and entities. Collections are composed of 
fluent Iiterals, the constant 0, and our connection function o. Below, variables of the sort 
“fluent literal” are indicated by e, variables of the sort “action name” by a, and variables 
of the sort “entity” by X, sometimes with sub- or superscripts. All other variables are of 
the sort “collection”. Free variables are implicitly assumed to be universally quantified. 
To begin, the following formula defmes a predicate Holds(e, s) with the intended 
meaning that .! is contained in S: 
Holds(e, s) z 32. e 0 z = s. (31) 
Then the following formula determines the constitutional properties of state terms: 
Stute( s) z Ve[ Holds( C, s) = lHulds( 2, s) ] A W, z. s # t 0 e o Z. (32) 
In words, s represents a state if it contains each fluent literal or its negation but not 
both. Furthermore, no fluent literal may occur twice (or more) in s. The following 
proposition states the adequacy of this formalization: 
Proposition 23. Let s be a collection of jluent literals, then EUNA, (31)) (32) b 
State(s) iff there exists some state S such that EUNA k s = ~5, else EUNA, (31), (32) k 
4tute( s). 
Proof. We have EUNA, (31), (32) /= State(s) iff 
EUNA,(31),(32) k (3z.eoz =s ~Vz’.~oz’+s) /~Vz.s#k’oeoz 
for each fluent literal 1. 
(33) 
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(=+) Suppose (33) holds for each fluent literal C. Let S := {C: EUNA + 3.~. eoz = s}, 
then the entailment of the first conjunct in (33) ensures that S is a state. It also ensures 
that S consists in the fluent literals which occur in s. Moreover, the entailment of 
the second disjunct in (33) ensures that no fluent literal occurs twice or more in s. 
Altogether this implies EUNA b s = 7s. 
(-+=) Suppose EUNA k s = 7s for some state S. Then all fluent literals in 78 occur 
exactly once in s. Let e be a fluent literal. S being a state implies that e E S iff 2 @ S. 
Thus, clause ( 1) of Proposition 22 ensures that the first conjunct in (33) is entailed. 
Moreover, since s does not contain a literal twice or more, s and e o 1 o z are not 
ACl-unifiable. This implies EUNA b ‘dz. s # e o e o z according to clause (3a) of 
Definition 21. 0 
Next, we show how to encode domain constraints in the fluent calculus. In order 
to exploit the extended notion of a fluent, we allow fluent formulas to quantify over 
entities. 
Definition 24. The set of Juent formulas is inductively defined as follows: Each fluent 
expression and T and I are fluent formulas, and if F and G are fluent formulas then 
so are F A G, F V G, F > G, F = G, 3x. F, and Vx. F (where x E V). 
A closed formula is a fluent formula without free variables, that is, where each 
occurring variable is bound by some quantifier. Let S be a state and F a closed fluent 
formula, then the notion of F being true (respectively false) in S is inductively defined 
as follows: 
(1) T is true and I is false in S; 
(2) a fluent literal e is true in S iff f? E S; 
(3) FAG is true in S iff F and G are true in S; 
(4) F V G is true in S iff F or G is true in S (or both); 
(5) F > G is true in S iff F is false in S or G is true in S (or both); 
(6) F z G is true in S iff F and G are true in S, or else F and G are false in 5’; 
(7) 3x. F is true in S iff there exists some o E c? such that F{x H o} is true in S; 
(8) Vx. F is true in S iff for each o E 0, F{x H o} is true in S. 
Here, F{.x H o} denotes the fluent formula resulting from replacing in F all free 
occurrences of x by o. 
In our electric circuit example, we will use the fluent formula Vx. on(x) s light as the 
underlying domain constraint to express the intended relation between the switches and 
the light bulb. This formula is true, for instance, in the state S = {on( sI ), on( s2), light}. 
Based on the definition of the Holds predicate (cf. (31))) the encoding of fluent 
formulas in the fluent calculus is straightforward. In order to state that a fluent formula 
is true in a state represented by some term s, each fluent literal e occurring in this formula 
is replaced by the expression Holds( e, s) . E.g., our domain constraint above becomes 
Vx. Holds( on( x) , s) s Holds( light, s) . (34) 
For formal reasons, we introduce a function r mapping a fluent formula F and some 
term s to a formula like (34). This transformation is inductively defined as follows: 
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VT(T,s) = T, 
77( I, s) = I, 
?r( e, s) = Holds( e, s) , 
z-(FAG,s) =T(F:s) r\~(G,s), 
z-( F V G, s) = rr(F: s) v rr(G, s), 
z-(F > G,s) =~r(F:s) > n(G,s), 
TT(F-G,s)=r(F,s) -r(G,s), 
?I-(Vx. F; s) = vx. 7?-( E s) ) 
T(3XF;S) =Llx.YT(F:s). 
(35) 
For notational convenience, we will usually write Holds( E s) instead of r( E s). Given 
the definition of Holds, (3 1) , and the extended unique name assumption, our encoding 
of fluent formulas is correct: 
Proposition 25. Let F be a Jluent formula and let S be a state, then EUNA, (3 1) /= 
Holds(Rrs) i’F is true in S, else EUNA, (31) k THolds(F; 7s). 
Proof. If e is a fluent literal then, according to Definition 24, e is true in S iff {l} C S. 
Following Proposition 22, the latter is equivalent to EUNA b 32. e o z = ~~7, which in 
turn is equivalent to EUNA, (31) k Holds(e, 7s) according to (31) and the definition 
of 7~. The claim can then be proved by straightforward induction on the structure of 
F. Cl 
In particular, we call Possible a state term that satisfies a given set of domain con- 
straints D: 
Possible(s) z A Holds(D, s) . 
DEV 
(36) 
In our example scenario, this amounts to (cf. (34) ) 
Possiblet s) s [Vx. Holds(on( x) , s) s Holds( light, s) 1. 
We conclude this section by introducing an extended notion of action laws. An 
action law may now contain variables, in which case it is considered representative 
for all of its ground instances. In what follows, the expression X (respectively 0) 
denotes a finite sequence of variables chosen from the given set V (respectively entities 
chosen from 0) of arbitrary but fixed length. If X is a sequence of the variables 
that occur free in some expression t, then this is written t[ ?I. Let ? = XI,. . . , x,$, 
then a ground instance of some expression &[X] is obtained by applying a substitution 
0 = {X, h 01,. . .) x,~o,}to[,whereot ,..., o,~O.LetZ=ot ,..., o,,then6[Zi]B 
is also denoted by [[ ZJ , 
Definition 26. Let A be a finite set of action names, each of which is associated with a 
natural number called arity. An action law is a triple (C [ Xl, a( X), Et?]) where C [ Tl 
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and E[X] are sets of fluent expressions and a E A is of arity equal to the length of X. 
It is assumed that (C[;S] 1 = (E[o] ( for any sequence 0 of entities. 
If S is a state, a ground instance a[51 of an action law cu[Z] = (C[jT],a(Z),E[Y]) 
is applicable in S iff C [ 01 C S. The application of ILY [ O] to S yields (S \ C [ 01) U E [ 01. 
Example 2 (continued). For our electric circuit domain, we define an action called 
toggle(x) by the following two laws: 
(37) 
When executing, say, toggle(st) in S = {on(st),on(~), light}, then the instance 0 = 
{x H st } of the first action law in (37) is applicable due to {on(x)}0 C_ S. The 
application yields 
<s\ {ono}) u {on(sd} = {on(s,),on(S2),light}. 
By defining a ternary predicate called Action, we encode a given set of action laws 
C={(C~~X~l,u~~~~),E~~~~l),...,(C,[~,,l,~,,~~,,~,~,,~~~l)} (n30) as follows: 
(38) 
The application of action laws according to Definition 26 is modeled in our fluent 
calculus-based encoding by defining a ternary predicate called Result. The intended 
meaning is that Result(s,a, s’) is true iff S’ represents the result of applying some 
instance of some action law for the action name a to the state represented by S: 
Rest&( s, a, s’) - 3c, e, z [Action(c, a, e) A c o z = s A s’ = z o e] . (39) 
Notice that the first equation, c o z = S, ensures that the condition of the action law at 
hand is contained in the state represented by s (cf. clause ( 1) of Proposition 22), This 
equation also guarantees that z contains all fluent literals in s but not in c (according to 
clause (2) of Proposition 22). Finally, the second equation encodes the addition of the 
effect, e, to z (according to clause (3) of Proposition 22). The following proposition 
states that this encoding is correct: 
Proposition 27. Let A be u set of action names, C = { (C;[X,] ) a(Zi) 9 E[Yi]): 1 < i 
6 n} a set of action laws, S a state, a E A of arity m, and 5 a sequence of entities of 
length m. Furthermore, let s’ be a collection of$uent literuls. Then 
EUNA, (38), (39) k Result(s,u(Z),s’) (40) 
ifthere exists an action law a[?] = (C[Y],u(Z),E[Z]) E l whose instance a[G] is 
applicable in S and whose application yields a state S’ such that EUNA + s’ = 7s’ , else 
EUNA, (38), (39) b ~Result(s,u(Z),s’). 
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Proof. From (38) and (39) in conjunction with the standard equality axioms, (29) E 
EUNA, it follows that (40) is true iff there is an instance (Ui[Z] of an action law 
cu,[X,] = (C;[Z~],a(Z;>,E[lY~]) in C such that 
EUNA +!Iz[Tc,,B, oz =sI\s’=z OTT<,;,,. 
This in turn is true iff 
( 1) Ci [ Z] C S (according to clause ( I ) of Proposition 22), and 
(2) EUNA /= s’ = ~(s\c,l~~)~~,l~l (according to clauses (2) and (3) of Proposi- 
tion 22 since (S\ Ci[O]) n Ei[O] = 0). 
Following Definition 26, these conditions are equivalent to ai [ 01 being applicable in S 
and resulting in S’ = (S \ Ci[Z] ) U Ei[Z] such that EUNA b s’ = 7s’. 0 
As before, however, the resulting state term s’ may violate the underlying domain 
constraints, i.e., (36) k lPossible( s’). In this case, the corresponding state term requires 
further manipulation by means of causal relationships. Their encoding within the fluent 
calculus is presented in the following section. 
6.2. Executing causal relationships 
Similar to the case of action laws, we may exploit the extended notational expres- 
siveness to formulate causal relationships with variables in their components. These 
relationships are then considered representatives for all of their ground instances. 
Definition 28. A causal relationship is an expression of the form E causes e if @ 
where Qi is a fluent formula and E and e are (possibly negated) fluent expressions. 
Let (S, E) be a pair consisting of a state S and a set of fluent literals E. Furthermore, 
let Y = G causes e if @ be a causal relationship, and let X denote a sequence of all 
free variables occurring in E, e, or @. Then an instance Y[ O] is applicable to (S, E) iff 
S k @[O] A m and E[ 51 E E. Its application yields the pair (S’, E’) where 
S’ = (S \ {era1 )I u {@[a 1 and E’ = (E \ {e[Cl}> U {d51}. 
Let A be a set of action names, C a set of action laws, 2, a set of domain constraints, 
and R a set of causal relationships. Furthermore, let S be a state satisfying V, a E A 
of arity m, and 0 a sequence of entities of length m. A state S’ is a successor state of S 
and a(6) iff there exists an applicable (with respect to S) instance a[o] of an action 
law cu[Z] = (C[F],a(X),E[Z]) EL such that 
(1) ((S\C[O]) uE[5],E[Zi])&_(S’,E’) for some E’, and 
(2) S’ satisfies ;D. 
Example 2 (continued). Based on the formalization of our electric circuit domain used 
throughout this section, we define the following two causal relationships: 
on(x) causes light if ‘my. on(y), 
(41) 
on(x) causes light if T. 
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Then the instance {X H st} of the first one is applicable to ({on(s,),on(s*),light), 
{on( ~1))) since Yy. on(y) A light is true in the first component of this state-effect pair 
and since on( st ) occurs in the second component. The application yields 
({on(sl),on(s2),light),(on(sl),light)). 
Now the first component satisfies the underlying domain constraint (cf. (34)), thus 
constitutes a successor state of {on( si ) , on( s2), light} and toggle( s1 ). 
Having the extended concept of causal relationships immediately raises the question 
how Definition 9 can be adapted-that is, how causal relationships with variables can be 
extracted from domain constraints given an appropriate notion of influence information. 
Doing this for arbitrary domain constraints, however, turns out to be a nontrivial problem. 
For instance, suppose we have a domain constraint of the form Y’xsy’v’~. p(x, y, z). 
Suppose also that some action causes some instance, say p( ot,u2,03), to become false 
and that the domain constraint is violated afterwards. Then we need to decide how this 
can be “corrected” by making some other instance p(o{, oi,oi) true. This obviously 
requires precise information on how the different instances of p interact. 
Since we assume finiteness of sets of entities, it is generally possible to rewrite 
any domain constraint so that it becomes quantifier free: Each Yx. F is replaced by 
/n\oEO F{x H o}, and each 3x. F is replaced by VoEO F{x H o}. If the components 
of the influence information are also restricted to pairs of (positive) ground fluent 
expressions, then Definition 9 can be directly adopted. 
Obviously, however, this method does not exploit the extended expressiveness of 
causal relationships with variables. As a consequence, the resulting set may contain large 
subsets, each of which could be represented by a single causal relationship. We therefore 
develop a generalization of Definition 9 at least for a certain class of domain constraints 
and influence information. For these domain constraints, the automatic extraction of 
causal relationships with variables is intuitive and a straightforward extension of the 
ground case. To be precise, we consider domain constraints in which each occurrence 
of a quantifier is of the form ‘G. e[ X] or of the form 3X. [[?I, where ![?I is a 
fluent expression with free variables X. Furthermore, the components of the influence 
information Z are interpreted as follows: If ft , f2 are fluent names, then (ft , f2) E Z 
indicates that a change of any instance fl (is,) may affect any instance f2(02). 
When computing the CNF of a set of domain constraints which is restricted in the 
above sense, sub-formulas Y’x. ![?I and 3X. e[Y] are treated like ordinary literals. Then 
each conjunct in the resulting CNF is a disjunction consisting of ground literals and 
expressions of the form Y?. e[ X] and 3X. e[ X] . On this basis, an adequate set of causal 
relationships is obtained as follows: 
Definition 29. Let V be a set of domain constraints. An influence information 1 
determines a set of causal relationships R following this procedure: 
(1) Let R := {}. 
(2) LetDiA...AD,betheCNFofAV.ForeachDi=F~V...VF,,, (i=l,...,n) 
do the following: 
(3) For each j = I,. . , rni do the following: 
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(4) For each k= l,..., mi, k#j, let 
@ := A 5, 29 
I = 1, w, 
I jj.1 $i 
and add the following causal relationships to R: 
(a) If Fj = l?j then 
(1) if Fk = !k then add q causes .$ if @, 
(2) if Fk =%,.!k[?k] then add c CaUSeS &[&I if @, 
(3) if Fk = 3&.-!k[zk] then add t,, CaUSeS &[x,] if &!k.&[&] A@. 
(b) If Fj =Ei.l,;[_i] then 
( 1) if Fk = & then add e,i [Xi] causes & if @, 
(2) if Fk =vzk.&[?k] then add JJ;[Zj] causes &[xk] if @, 
(3) ifFk=!&.&[&] thenaddmcausesPk[Yk] if tJ?k.-@&@. 
(c) If Fj = 5;. l,i[I?j] then 
( 1) if Fk = !k then add e,i [ g,] causes !k if V’xi. e,rxi] A @, 
(2) ifFk=\J?k.!k[?k] thenaddei[x,lcauses!k[?k] if VXj.m//@, 
(3) if Fk = 3%k.!k[?k] then add !i[Z,j] CaLlSeS fk[i?k] if Y?j.mA 
%?k. ek[xkl A @. 
In any of these cases, however, add the respective causal relationship only if 
(lt,jl, lekj) E z. 
Example 2 (continued). Recall our domain constraint D = \Jx. on(x) E light, and let 
Z = {(on, light)}. Applying Definition 29 yields the following causal relationships: 
l The CNF of D is (3x. on(x) V light) A (Vx. on(x) V light). 
l As regards the first conjunct, DI = 3x. on(x) V light, we obtain the following: 
-Incasej=l,k=2 
on(x) causes 
according to clause 
- In case j = 2, k = 1 
l As regards the second 
- Incase j=l, k=2 
on(x) causes 
according to clause 
- In case j = 2, k = 1 
we have (on, light) E 1, which yields 
light if ‘dx. on(x) 
(cl). 
we have (light, on) # 1. 
conjunct, 02 = Vx. on(x) V light, we obtain the following: 
we have (on, light) E 1, which yields 
light if T 
(bl). 
we have (light, on) $1. 
Altogether, we obtain exactly the two causal relationships granted in (41). 
The encoding of a given set of causal relationships R = (~1 [Xl] = ~1 causes ~1 
if @I,... , r, [ Xn ] = E, causes pn if @,,} (n 3 0) in the fluent calculus follows 
Definition 28. We define a predicate Causes(s, e, s’, e’) which is intended to be true 
- 
2y If F/ = VZ. Y[ ,Y] then E denotes the formula 3k. ![,?I, and if F, = 3X. @I k] then 9 denotes VT. P[i]. 
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iff there is an instance of a causal relationship in R which is applicable to (S, E) and 
whose application yields (S’, E/)-where s, e, s’, and e’ are term representations of S. 
E, S’, and E’: 




Holds(@; A 5, s) A 3z (i o z = s A s’ = z o pi) 
A 





This definition needs explanation. The first row in the right-hand side of the formula 
encodes the two conditions @i r\g be true in S and S’ = (S\{z}) U { pi}. The second row 
encodes the condition si E E. Finally, to encode the condition E’ = (E \ {z}) U {pi}, 
two cases have to be distinguished: If z $! E, then we just have to add pi to the 
corresponding term e (third row). If, on the other hand, z E E, then we have to 
additionally remove the sub-term ‘& from e (fourth row). The following proposition 
shows that this encoding is correct given the definition of Holds, (31), in conjunction 
with our encoding of fluent formulas (cf. (35)): 
Proposition 30. Let R be a set of causal relationships. Furthermore, let S be a state, 
E a set of Jluent literals, and s’ and e’ two collections of fluent literals. Then 
ElJNA,(31),(42) /= Causes(Ts,TE,s’,e’) (43) 
iff there exist two sets ofjuent literals S’ and E’ such that EUNA k s’ = rs~ A e’ = 7~’ 
and (SE) +-R (S’,E’), else EUNA,(31),(42) /=Causes(~s,~E,s’,e’). 
Proof. From (42) it follows that (43) is true iff there is an instance ri[ 01 of a causal 
relationship ri [ Xi] = Ei causes pi if @i in R such that the conjunction in the right-hand 
side of (42) is entailed. This in turn holds iff 
( 1) Qii [ Z] A pi [ 01 is true in S (according to Proposition 25) ; 
C2) s’ = T~s\{Qi~4~YJ{dal) (according to clauses (2) and (3) of Proposition 22) ; 
(3) (4~1) C E ( according to clause ( 1) of Proposition 22) ; and 
(4) (a) either {m} $Z E and e’ = rEu{L1~[611 (according to clauses (1) and (3) 
of Proposition 22)) 
(b) or else {ei[i?l} C E and e’ = rCE,~~l)u~p,rC,) (according to clauses 
(l)-(3) of Proposition 22). ’ 
Following Definition 28, these conditions are equivalent to (S, E) -++{r,ral) (S’, E’) for 
sets S’ and E’ such that EUNA b s’ = 7s’ and EUNA /= e’ = rKf. 0 
According to Definition 28, a successor state is obtained from an intermediate state 
by repeatedly applying causal relationships until a state results that does not violate the 
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domain constraints. In order to encode this by means of the fluent calculus, we define 
a predicate Rami~( s, e, s’). It is intended to be true iff the successive application of 
causal relationships to (S, E) eventually results in a pair whose first component, S’, 
satisfies the domain constraints-where s, e, and s’ are term representations of S, E, 
and S’. This essentially requires to construct the transitive closure of the Causes relation 
defined in (42). As this cannot be expressed in first-order logic, we use the standard 
way of encoding transitive closure using a second-order formula: 
fjSl,el.n(sl,el,sl,el) 
A 
Rami&( s, e, s’) - VII 
[ 
VSI, el, ~2, e2, $3. e3 
(H(sl,el,S2,e2) ACul(ses(s;?,e;!,s3,e3) 
3 fl(s17e17s3,e3)) I 
3 
3e’. Z7( s, e, s’, e’) 
(44) 
A Possible( s’) . 
That is, Ramifi( s, e, s’) is true iff both there is some e’ such that (s, e, s’, e’) is in the 
transitive closure of Causes, and s’ satisfies the domain constraints. 
Finally, adding the ramification process to formula (39) completes our encoding. An 
instance Successor( s, a, s’) shall be true iff s’ represents a successor state of a and the 
state represented by s: 
Successor( s, a, s’) 
-3c,e,z[Action(c,a,e) Acoz =sARumi&(z oe,e,s’)]. 
(45) 
To summarize, let 3C denote the union of EUNA with the definitions of Holds (31)) 
Possible (36)) Action (38)) Causes (42)) Ramify (44)) and Successor (45)) based on 
given sets of domain constraints, action laws, and causal relationships. As the main 
result of the second part of this paper we prove that 3C provides a correct encoding of 
our solution to the ramification problem. 
Theorem 31. Let 3C be the encoding of a set of domain constraints, a set of action 
laws, and a set of causal relationships. Furthermore, let A be a set of action names, 
S and S’ two states, a E A of arity m, and 0 a sequence of entities of length m. Then 
3C j= Successor( s, a( ;5>, s’) 
iff there is a successor state S’ of S and a(Z) such that EDNA b s’ = rs~, else 
3C + +uccessor( s, a( 5)) s’). 
Proof. The result follows from Definition 28, Propositions 27 and 30, and the fact that 
(44) encodes the transitive closure of the Causes relation plus the requirement to satisfy 
the domain constraints (cf. (36) in conjunction with Proposition 25). Cl 
7. Discussion 
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We have presented a method to accommodate indirect effects of actions which in- 
volves the notion of causality to distinguish intuitively conceivable from unmotivated 
changes. To this end, we have developed the concept of causal relationships, each of 
which connects two effects with the intended meaning that, under specific circumstances, 
the occurrence of the former causes the occurrence of the latter as indirect effect. Causal 
relationships are serially applied to the intermediate state resulting from computing the 
direct effects of an action in order to reach a state that satisfies all underlying domain 
constraints. Moreover, we have argued that causal relationships can be generated auto- 
matically given additional domain-specific knowledge-called injluence information-of 
how fluents may generally affect each other. 
We have illustrated the expressiveness of our approach regarding the problem of im- 
plicit qualifications versus indirect effects (Section 3.3), fluents which resist any catego- 
rization (Section 5.1)) domains involving expected non-minimal change (Section 5.2), 
and regarding domain constraints that require a sophisticated distinction between qual- 
ification and ramification (Section 5.3). These results form the basis for comparing 
the method presented in this paper with existing approaches to the ramification prob- 
lem. 
The necessity of additional information to prevent changes that are suggested syntac- 
tically by the mere domain constraints but contradict the intuition, was first observed 
in [ 151 in the context of the possible worlds approach [ 141. There, indirect effects 
of actions are implicitly obtained by searching for successor states staying as close as 
possible to the original state while satisfying both the direct effects of the action under 
consideration and the domain constraints. Although the authors argued that this might 
yield unintended changes (such as a switch magically jumping its position in the circuit 
depicted in Fig. l), no solution was offered. 
In [ 241, the first and most elementary categorization-based solution to this problem 
was formally developed by distinguishing between so-called frame and non-frame flu- 
ents. so Only the former are subject to the persistence assumption, and their truth-values 
completely determine the truth-values of the latter. Similar ideas have been used e.g. in 
[ 71, in (the second part of) [4], and in [ 221. More sophisticated categorization meth- 
ods do not simply restrict persistence to one category by allowing arbitrary changes in 
the other. Instead they exploit different categories to define a partial preference ordering 
among all possible changes (as in our Definition 16)) e.g. [ 391. In [40], a systematic 
framework based on this concept is introduced with the aim of assessing the range of 
applicability of different approaches that follow the same principles. However, we have 
already argued in Section 5.1 that even if it is possible to assign an appropriate category 
to each fluent in a particular domain if only the categorization is suitably fine-grained, 
the more complex a domain is the more difficult this task becomes as it requires a 
deep analysis of possible interactions. Besides, despite being the only suitable one, a 
“’ Earlier, the author of 1481 raised the idea of introducing some notion of preference as regards changes of 
specific fluents to changes of other fluents. Yet her discussion was only informal and took place in the context 
of an example. 
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particular categorization may appear very unnatural even in simple domains, as we have 
illustrated in the context of Example 17. 
More recently, several approaches have been established that take into account specific 
notions of causality, as does our method, to tackle the problem of unintended changes. 
The monotonic, situation calculus-based formalism developed in [ 81 supports specifi- 
cations of indirect effects by means of complete descriptions of how the truth-value 01 
a particular fluent might be caused to change. As an example, recall the basic electric 
circuit domain, which [8] would encode as 
~u,s[Cuuses(a,s,light) = (Cuuses(a,s,sw,) AHolds(sw:!,s)) 
v (Cuuses( a, s, sw2) A Holds( SW, ) s) ) ] ) 
Vu, s[ Cuncels( a, s, light) = Cuncels( a, s, SWI ) V Cuncels( a, s, SW?) ] 
(46) 
where Cuuses( a, s, f) should be read as “executing action a in situation s causes fluent 
f to become true”, Cuncels(u, s, f) as “executing action CI in situation s causes fluent 
f to become false”, and Holds( f, s) as “fluent f is true in situation s”. Suppose we are 
given the specification of how SWI may become true (respectively false), viz. 
‘da, s[ Cuuses( a, s, SWI ) = a = toggle, A lHofds( SW! , s) 1, 
Vu,s[Cuncels(u,s,sw~) 3 a = toggle, AHolds(swl, s)] 
plus this general axiom of persistence: 
VLZ, s, f[ Holds( f, do( a, s) ) 
-_ Cuuses( a, s, f) V (Holds( f, s) A 7Cuncels( a, s, f) ) ] (47) 
where &(a, s) denotes the situation obtained by executing action a in situation s. 
One then obtains, say, that +folds(swl, so) A Holds(sw2, so) A lHolds(light, SO) im- 
plies Cuuses( toggle,, SO, SWI ) and, hence, Cuuses( toggle,, SO, light). This in turn implies 
Holds(light,do(toggle,, SO)), as intended. No effort has to be made to suppress an un- 
wanted change of sw2 since no causal relation similar to (46) exists that may support 
this. On the other hand, the use of if-and-only-if descriptions of causal dependencies, as 
in (46), is restricted to domains where these dependencies are acyclic, i.e., hierarchical. 
Otherwise, i.e., if fluents depend mutually, unmotivated changes cannot be precluded. 
To see why, consider the simplest possible cyclic specification, namely, 
Vu, s[Cuuses(a, s, f~) = Cuuses(u,s, f2) 1 (48) 
Suppose a is an action whose execution in SO does not influence fr nor f2, then formula 
(48) in conjunction with the persistence axiom (47) is too weak to conclude that both fr 
and f2 keep their truth-values. For neither Xuuses(u, SO, f 1) nor Cuuses(u, SO, f2) is 
entailed. The two mechanically connected switches discussed in Section 3.1, for instance, 
constitute a simple example which falls into the category of mutual dependencies. A 
second limitation of [ 81 compared to our approach stems from the fact that the formula 
in the right-hand side of a definition like (46) either refers to the original state (in case 
of Holds( f, s)) or to the finally resulting successor state (in case of Cuuses( a, s, f) or 
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Cuncels( n, s, f), respectively, in conjunction with the persistence axiom). Consequently, 
no intermediately occurring fact can possibly trigger an indirect effect; hence, this 
formalization does not allow for deriving the successor state where a flash of the light 
bulb is recorded by the light detector in our Example 18. 
In [4,29], the notion of causality is introduced by defining so-called causal rules (cf. 
Definition 11). By virtue of being directed deduction rules, they cannot be applied in a 
non-causal way (e.g., WI A sw2 + light has a different meaning than, say, WI A light 
=+ m). Besides a far more simple formalization employed in [ 291 compared to [ 41, 
the latter does not allow for deriving implicit qualifications rather than ramifications 
from domain constraints (cf. Section 3.3). The reason is that in the approach [ 41 
one always strives for a successor state no matter how many changes are necessary to 
this end, while [29] additionally requires all changes be explicitly grounded on some 
causal rule. Apart from this, the two approaches appear closely related. For instance, 
we strongly presume their equivalence in case of deterministic actions and domain 
” constraints which do not give rise to qualifications.. In particular, both methods are 
grounded on the policy of minimal change, which amounts to rejecting any potential 
successor state whose distance to the original state is strictly larger than the distance 
of another proper successor state. As argued in Section 5.2, however, this paradigm 
might not always capture the intuition because successor states may exist which have 
non-minimal distance but are equally plausible. A second difference between these two 
approaches on the one hand and our concept of causal relationships on the other hand, 
has been elaborated in Section 5.3. Recall that there we have illustrated a lack of 
expressiveness of causal rules regarding sophisticated distinctions between qualifications 
and ramifications triggered by one and the same domain constraint. Finally, we want 
to stress that in the approaches of [4,29] it is assumed that causal rules be given as 
part of a domain specification. This requires more design effort than necessary-as can 
be seen by our suggestion to generate causal relationships automatically by employing 
more general information on potential influences. 
Similar remarks apply to a recently developed integration of causality into the situation 
calculus-based framework presented in 1261, also with the aim of handling indirect 
effects 12.51. There, first-order formulas resembling causal relationships are used to 
define dependencies between effects and their indirect consequences. These formulas 
arc of the form 
Vs[@(s) ACuused(fl,ul,s) A...ACuused(f,,o,,,s) 3Cuused(f,u,s)] (49) 
where Cuused(f, u, s) should be read as “fhtent f is caused to take truth-value u in 
situation s”, and where Q(s) describes properties of situation s. As an example, recall 
the basic electric circuit domain, whose encoding by means of the approach [ 251 would 
include 
Vs[ Holds( sw2, s) A Cuused( swl , true, s) > Cuused( light, true, s) ] 
” Moreover, a third approach, I 1 I, I2 1, which is based on a nonmonotonic theory of “conditional entailment”. 
is similar to [ 4,29 1 in using expressions which resemble causal rules. A thorough and formal comparison 
between these three frameworks, however, has not yet been performed. 
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along with the action definition j’ 
Vs[ +Jolds(swl , s) > Cuused(swl , true, do( toggle,, s) ) 1. 
The general axiom of persistence employed in this context is 
(50) 
This axiom is of course useless unless the extension of the predicate Caused is minimized 
given the direct effects of actions (like in (50)) and the laws of causality (each of 
which is of the form (49) ) . This is formally achieved by applying circumscription [ 301. 
Hence, besides also leaving the effort of constructing the various causal relations to the 
designer, this method is grounded on the paradigm of minimal change as well. In fact, 
this work, too, appears closely related to [ 4,291. Notice, however, that the scheme (49) 
is expressive enough to allow for the sophisticated distinction between ramification and 
qualification discussed in Section 5.3. The reason for this is that the predicate Caused 
may occur in the left-hand side of the implication (49). For instance, our Example 19 
can be solved by employing 
VJS [Holds( at-trap, s) A Cuused( trap-open, true, s) > Cuused( alive, false, s) 
but not 
‘ds[ Holds( trap-open, s) A Cuused(ut-trap, true, s) > Cuused( ulive,fulse, s) 1. 
In order to account for expected non-minimal changes, more sophisticated means than 
minimization have to be developed for the approaches discussed above. This requires 
to carefully distinguish between conceivable changes, triggered by actually occurred 
(direct or indirect) effects, and unfounded changes. The approach developed in [ 271, 
which uses Dijkstra’s semantics of programming languages to reason about actions, 
fails to address this challenge appropriately. In this approach, the ramification problem 
is tackled by allowing actions to (temporarily) release fluents from being subject to 
the assumption of persistence. But in case the domain constraints do not completely 
determine the new values of all in this way released fluents, unexpected effects may 
be produced (e.g., a turkey magically starts walking if being shot at with an unloaded 
gun). 33 Our causal relationships account for this problem since they are only applicable 
if the respective triggering effect either is among the direct effects or has previously 
been generated as indirect effect. 
An approach which is considerably different from all methods discussed so far yet 
still related, is based on networks representing probabilistic causal theories [ 341. These 
networks describe, in the first place, static dependencies among their components. -4s 
argued in [ 35,361, however, the truth-values of one or more nodes may be re-set 
dynamically and, then, the values of all depending nodes need to be adjusted according 
to standard (Bayesian) rules of probability. This can be regarded as generating indirect 
effects. If probability values are restricted to the binary 01 l-case, then a network whose 
72 For the sake of simplicity we neglect the concept of action preconditions. 
” We thank Vladimir Lifschitz for this observation. 
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Fig. 6. Graphs representing the structural dependencies between Ruents regarding (a) Example 18, (b) 
- -. 
Example 19, and (c) the domain constraint SWI V SW? (Inducing a cycle), respectively. 
nodes are fluent names resembles our concept of influence information. For instance, 
Fig. 6(a) depicts a network suitable for Example 18. Although the relation between 
this approach and the other methods discussed in this section is far from being formally 
established today, let us point out some restrictions of causal networks compared to the 
concept of causal relationships. First, recall Fig. 6(a). Since the resulting value of a 
node, after having fixed the direct effects, must not be computed until all new values of 
its predecessors have been determined, the proposition detect necessarily remains false 
regarding Example 18 since light stays false; hence, the non-minimal successor state 
where a light flash has been detected cannot be obtained. Second, recall Example 19. 
Since a change of trap-open might cause a change of alive depending on at-trap, the 
adequate network is the one depicted in Fig. 6(b). This, however, does not allow to 
distinguish between the two situations where either trap-open becomes true with at-trap 
being true, or it happens to be the other way round. Hence, the sophisticated distinction 
whose necessity has been claimed in Section 5.3, is not supported by causal networks- 
similar to causal rules. Finally, networks representing causal theories are based on acyclic 
graphs, which means that simple examples like the mechanically connected switches (cf. 
Section 3.1; relationships (3) and (4)) cannot be represented (cf. Fig. 6(c) ). Aside 
from these rather specific observations, however, we would consider it most interesting 
to have a formal result regarding the range of applicability of approaches based on 
probabilistic networks. The calculus presented in [36], for instance, considers only 
actions without preconditions, and it merely refers to the temporal projection problem, 
which denotes the task to predict the effects of action sequences. This raises the question 
how this approach can also be applied in other modes of reasoning like planning or 
postdiction (also called chronicle completion in [ 381) ; the latter of which deals with 
finding explanations for observations made during the execution of action sequences. 
This discussion leads us to the question of how to exploit the insights gained in 
this article. Our formalization in the first part of this paper has been embedded in a 
high-level, abstract description language and semantics for action scenarios, where we 
have concentrated on aspects of ramifications only and, to this end, employed a simple 
form of action specifications as regards direct effects. Three recent, similarly high-level 
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action semantics focus on sophisticated ways to formalize this aspect, namely, the action 
description language [ 131, the ego-world-semantics [381, and the framework presented 
in [ 461. These approaches are considered prime candidates for being enhanced by the 
concept of causal relationships. In case of the action description language, this should 
be based on the dialect developed in [ 31, which includes the notion of nondeterminism, 
here needed if more than a single successor state exists. The resulting extension would 
constitute an alternate to the variant of the action description language presented in 
[22], which handles ramifications on the basis of categorization and minimization, as 
does the extension of the ego-world-semantics presented in [40]. 
The main purpose of these three formal frameworks is to provide a uniform semantics 
for calculi designed to reason about actions and change. Given our formal proposal 
to handle indirect effects, existing calculi can be extended in such a way that their 
solution to the ramification problem is provably correct with respect to our semantics. 
As an example formalism, in the second part of this paper we have adapted the fluent 
calculus [ 19,201. Our Theorem 3 1 demonstrates that our extension of this approach is 
correct with respect to the formal semantics described in the first part. While the work 
reported in this article has been concentrated solely on the ramification problem, the 
fluent calculus-besides being closely related, in its basic form, to the linear connection 
method [ 21 and reasoning about actions based on linear logic [ 16,28]-has shown 
a wide range of applicability, e.g. regarding postdiction problems and nondeterministic 
actions [ 31, reasoning about counter-factual action sequences [ 441, or concurrent actions 
in conjunction with (locally) inconsistent specifications [ 31. Thus, a main goal of future 
research consists in combining all these results, each of which focuses on a single 
ontological aspect, into a uniform and expressive calculus. 
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